"Philosophy of Humanism and Enlightenment": Kant and Neo-Kantians in Yevhen Spektorskyi's Investigations into Philosophy of Social Science

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Abstract

The article explores the influence of Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy on a prominent philosopher and educator, Yevhen Vasyliovych Spektorskyi's (1875–1951) views regarding the nature and methodology of social sciences. First, it explores Spektorskyi's consideration of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as a philosopher of science, emphasizing the critical aspect of his philosophy and its significant prospects for ethics and social philosophy. Next, it investigates how Spektorskyi became acquainted with and was influenced by Neo-Kantian philosophy, especially the Marburg school. The main problem through the lens of which Spektorskyi analyzed their achievements was the idea of "pure" ethics as a firm foundation for social science, while criticizing Herman Cohen (1842–1918) for claiming this foundation to lie in jurisprudence. Despite being an adherent of the Baden school, Bohdan Kistiakivskyi (1868–1920) presented views that were quite similar to Spektorskyi's regarding the exceptional status and methods of social science. The emphasis on logical procedures and the need for rational discussion allows us to draw a parallel between Spektorskyi and the development of Kantian ideas in the 20th-century communicative philosophy. The justification of the "moral" sciences led Spektorskyi to criticize the Baden Neo-Kantians, advocating for the moral nature of social sciences and their importance in constructing social reality. The project of rational social science aimed at governance and politics is reminiscent of Kant's "anthroponomy."

Key Words: Kant, Neo-Kantian Philosophy, history of philosophy, philosophy of social sciences, ethics, methodology of science, Yevhen Spektorskyi, Bohdan Kistiakivskyi, Kyiv academic philosophy.

Introduction

The German Neo-Kantian philosopher Otto Liebmann's call to go "Back to Kant!" expressed by him in the work *Kant und die Epigonen (Kant and the Epigones)* in 1865, seems more than justified given in the intellectual situation of that time. Supporters and successors of the traditions of metaphysical systems were confronted with their limited heuristic potential, while science-oriented thinkers created their own (materialist) metaphysics, adopting mostly naturalistic dogmas from the natural science. In the context of the search for a methodological basis for the social sciences, an appeal to the legacy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Neo-Kantianism, which

appeared in the middle of the 19th century, turned out to be one of the most attractive alternatives to the prevalent positivism and Marxism of that period.

Among the thinkers whose life and career were closely connected with Ukraine and who actively worked on rethinking Kant's legacy was Yevhen Vasyliovych Spektorskyi (1875–1951), an outstanding philosopher, lawyer, and sociologist. His name is essential for the history of many educational institutions and scientific organizations in different countries. An alumnus of the Imperial University of Warsaw (1897), a master's degree holder (1911), and a candidate for state law (1918), Spektorskyi is recognized as an eminent researcher and a talented educational leader. He served as the a head of the Kyiv Scientific-philosophical Society (1914–1918), the dean of the Law Faculty (1918), and the last rector of Saint Volodymyr University in Kyiv (1918–1919).

His encyclopedic knowledge enabled Spektorskyi to successfully continue his career after his enforced emigration from Bolshevik Russia. He worked as a professor at the University of Belgrade (1920–1924, 1927–1930), the dean of the Russian law faculty in Prague (1924–1927), a professor at the University of Ljubljana (1930–1945), and the head of the Slovenian society of the philosophy of law and sociology. Spektorskyi spent his last years in the USA (1947–1951) as both the head of the Russian academic group in the USA and a professor at St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York.

Spektorskyi was well-versed in contemporary philosophical trends, including the results of the development of critical idealism, and the active rethinking of Kantian philosophy at the leading universities of Western Europe. Moreover, these results significantly impacted the ideological direction of his research and teaching activities. In this article, we will consider Spektorskyi's appeal to the legacy of the German thinker and his followers, as well as the development of Kant's and Neo-Kantians' ideas in his own research, primarily on the methodology of social science and social philosophy.

"Forward with Kant!"

At the very beginning of his scientific career, Spektorskyi responded to Liebman's oft-quoted appeal with the following words: "Therefore, instead of the dogmatic and essentially retrograde motto "Back to Kant!" which is so often used in modern philosophy, one should consider another call: "Forward with Kant!" to correspond better to the tasks of critique."[1] He argued there is a need to interpret Kant and his philosophy not dogmatically but critically, understanding his legacy in light of the latest achievements of science and philosophy. After all, "Kant was a man of the 18th century, and we – we have already moved into the 20th century,"[2] as Spektorskyi

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1   Evgenii Spektorskii, "Entciklopediia ekonomicheskikh, iuridicheskikh i politicheskikh nauk. Kurs lektcii" ["The Encyclopaedia of Economical, Juridical and Political Sciences. Course of Lectures"], 1903, no 31, fond. 43: Spektorskyi Yevhen Vasylovych (1875–1919). Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library, Kyiv.

2   Yevgen Spektorskyi, "Kant i sotsialna filosofiia" ["Kant and Social Philosophy"], publication, translation and introduction by Maryna Tkachuk, *Dukh i Litera* 7–8 (2001): 329.

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emphasized in his report *Kant i sotsialna Filosofia (Kant and Social Philosophy)*, delivered on 1 (14) February 1904, at the solemn meeting of the Society for the History of Philosophy and Law at the University of Warsaw.[3]

In this report, Spektorskyi calls Kant "the greatest... critical philosopher"[4] and assigns critical philosophy essential tasks that only it can fulfill: to unite disparate knowledge, to provide distinct critical principles of objective understanding to the sciences, and to indicate the ways of their implementation. According to Spektorskyi, critical idealism is the most essential and irreplaceable component of Kant's philosophical legacy. "Critical philosophy does not recognize the existence of a meaning other than that which can be established by our cognitive resources nor does it recognize other norms of what ought to be, except those that can arise from the requirements of our reason,"[5] the researcher noted, emphasizing its rejection of transcendental being and metaphysics in general.

Following Kant, Spektorskyi asserts that an idea, "in the strictly critical sense of the word, is not something existing outside our thought, nor something given to it externally. It is nothing more than a principle of our consciousness. These are the goals and tasks it sets for itself and strives to realize."[6] It is vital to note that an idea interpreted in this way cannot be realized at all since it is infinite, and this infinity is transferred to cognition through the use of an idea, particularly in scientific cognition.

Clarifying the origin of ideas is not a task of critical philosophy. Still, critical understanding and the purification from metaphysical elements turn ideas into "formal principles and criteria for evaluating and rebuilding any existence."[7] Spektorskyi emphasizes the non-empirical nature of ideas, their primarily negative effect on the arrangement of empirical data, and their formality, which indicates the direction of the purposeful transformation of the empirical. The latter constitutes the process of scientific knowledge and transformation in the realms of practical reason: ethics (based on the idea of practical truth) and aesthetics (having beauty as its principle). The researcher summarizes the importance of these postulates, as proved by Kant, as follows: "Kant's immortal merit is that he proved that idealism, of course, if it is understood critically enough, is not vain fantasy and vague dreams. On the contrary, it constitutes a necessary condition for everything, although partly permanent, which is created by us in the world of thought, will, and feeling, that is: science, ethics, and art."[8]

Next, Spektorskyi outlines the foundations of Kant's epistemology in the context of scientific knowledge, emphasizing the following theses: 1. The "Thing-in-itself" is a regulatory task of research, a principle of knowledge, but not knowledge

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3   Ibid., 349.
4   Ibid., 329.
5   Ibid., 331.
6   Ibid.
7   Ibid., 332.
8   Ibid.

itself;[9] 2. The fundamental unrecognizability of the "thing-in-itself" does not lead to cognitive pessimism but serves to protect science from plunging into a "dogmatic dream" and emphasizes the need to learn more; 3. As Kant proved, asserting anything about the transcendent is metaphysical because it leads to antinomies. Thus, Spektorskyi that the unifying function of ideas does not involve adding new empirical knowledge to what is already known. Ideas, according to him, "... warn theoretical thought against materialism, that is, against the assertion that the material of our experiential knowledge is the ultimate absolute truth. They lead the mind from the sphere of theoretical knowledge to the path of practical aspirations and thus open up new horizons, giving ample space for the realization of ideas."[10]

The realm of practical reason was especially relevant to Spektorskyi, given the scientist's lively interest in social science issues throughout his life. The philosopher, relying on Kant, emphasizes prioritizing practical reason over theoretical reason and emphasizes the exceptional importance of both Kant's theoretical and moral ideas for social life. It is interesting to note what Spektorskyi observed regarding the socio-theoretical significance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), which, as he notes, consists in defining common and necessary moments in cognition for all people.

Regarding the central element of Kant's practical philosophy – the categorical imperative – Spektorskyi mentions that "the glorious categorical imperative subordinates every individual act to the social idea."[11] An act can only be considered moral if it is consistent with this universal and necessary principle because ethics is inherently social and necessarily presupposes a specific social context, even if that context is imaginary. Reasonable goals that a person is guided by, in accordance with a categorical imperative (instead of hypothetical ones), acquire a more significant, universal dimension. The main goal, which is also the basis for critical philosophy, is the conception of the human as such; in other words, the idea of humans as a free and intelligent being who are absent in empirical reality. According to Spektorskyi, the highest motive of critically interpreted social philosophy is "humanity, humanism."[12] The scientist emphasizes Kant's order to see another person as a goal, not a means, and stresses that the ideal person should be seen in every individual, which is the highest goal of critical philosophy.

Summarizing and outlining the role of critical philosophy in building the future, Spektorskyi emphasizes the need for critical philosophy, which necessitates separating what is brought into knowledge by the mind from metaphysics and dogmatics. In social cognition, critical philosophy is essential for purifying social philosophy from naturalism, a school of thought that has been highly influential since the 19th century.

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9   Spektorskyi also emphasized this thesis in his course of lectures given in Warsaw University: "No matter how objective our knowledge of things may be, we must never, in order to avoid dogmatism and metaphysics, assert that we possess unconditional and final knowledge" (Spektorskyi, "Entciklopediia," 60).

10   Ibid., 334.

11   Ibid., 335.

12   Ibid., 336.

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Such negative work will become the foundation for productive activity, namely, "... the introduction of regulative principles of social idealism into social science,"[13] which represents an almost primary task given the need for these sciences to establish themselves as autonomous and reliable.

Spektorskyi's acquaintance with the Neo-Kantian movement in European universities

Like many scholars of his generation, Spektorskyi had an opportunity to visit universities and libraries in Europe during a two-year research trip beginning on January 1, 1902, during which he visited the universities of Heidelberg, Paris, Strasbourg, Zurich, and Berlin.[14] Spektorskyi primarily attended classes on state law but also collected materials for his master's thesis, published in 1910, and entitled *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki v XVII stoletii. T. 1. Novoe mirovozzrenie i novaia teoriia nauki (The Problem of Social Physics in the XVII Century. Volume I. A New Worldview and a New Theory of Science)*[15] which he defended at Yuryiv (now Tartu) University.

At the University of Heidelberg, he listened to the lectures of outstanding philosophers and historians of philosophy, such as Kuno Fischer (1824–1907) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915). Recalling the philosophy of one of the prominent thinkers of the Baden school of Neo-Kantianism – *Windelband's theory about nomothetic* and *idiographic* sciences – Spektorskyi noted: "I ... was not impressed by this teaching. When explaining the theory of the Baden school in my later lectures, I focused more on ... Heinrich Rickert."[16] Nevertheless, the Baden school of Neo-Kantianism influenced the formation of Spektorskyi's classification of sciences, which is especially evident in his later work and research into the philosophy of culture.

In the summer of 1904, Spektorskyi visited another center of the Neo-Kantian movement – Marburg, where he met Hermann Kogen and Paul Natorp. While listening to their courses, he paid particular attention to Cohen's work *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Kant's Theory of Experience)* (1871), in which the *Critique of Pure Reason* is interpreted as a philosophical review of the worldview constructed by Johann Kepler,

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13   Ibid., 339.

14   See Vasyl Ulianovskyi, Viktor Korotkyi, and Oleksandr Skyba, *Ostannii rektor Universytetu Sviatoho Volodymyra Yevhen Vasylovych Spektorskyi* [*The Last Rector of Saint Volodymyr University Yevhen Vasylovych Spektorskyi*] (Kyiv: Kyivskyi universytet, 2007), 88.

15   Yevgenii Spektorskii, *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki v XVII stoletii* [*The Problem of Social Physics in 17th Century*], vol. 1. "Novoe mirovozzrenie i novaia teoriia nauki" [New Outlook and New Theory of Science] (Saint Petersburg: Nauka, 2006).

16   Yevgenii Spektorskii, *Vospominaniya* [*Memoirs*], introduction by Sergei Mikhalchenko and Elena Tkachenko, comments by Sergei Mikhalchenko and Pavel Tribunovskii (Ryazan, 2020), 114.

Galileo Galilei, and Isaac Newton. This approach to Kant's philosophy appealed to Spektorskyi.[17]

According to Spektorskyi's works written in the 1900s, he highly valued the philosophy of the Marburg school and its idealism "in its purest and strictly methodological and critical sense of the word, free from metaphysics…"[18] Rejecting metaphysics, dogmatism, and belief in the transcendent, critical idealism, noted Spektorskyi, does not resort to skepticism, but finds support "in the pure, autonomous ideas of reason, free from any external support or authorities …, and relies only in itself, as the one that finds the guarantee of its truth and credibility in its logical requirements."[19]

Neo-Kantianism, an intellectual movement in Germany (extending from the mid-19th century to the 1920s), is commonly regarded as a history of two schools – the Baden (Southwest) and the Marburg schools. Although they differed in their emphasis on specific problems, they shared several common theses. Both Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) were concerned with "critical idealism," reflecting the objective meaning of subjective knowledge while indicating the grounds of this significance in Kant's philosophy. Opposing psychologism, Cohen and Windelband sought to free the theory of knowledge from psychological influences by demarcating the boundaries between philosophy and psychology. They developed the concept of a "pure" subject as the basis of knowledge, advanced the theory and methodology of science based on Kantian transcendentalism, and gave due attention to the latest achievements and problems of science, especially its dynamic growth.[20]

On the one hand, the two schools had different approaches to philosophy and the sciences. Windelband presented a "critical method," according to which the principles of philosophy are grounded in universal values. Moreover, he emphasized the methodological distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methods in the empirical sciences and accused Cohen of neglecting the human sciences.[21]

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17 The scientist quite often used this characteristic of Critique of Pure Reason. For example, in the first volume of the work "Ocherki po filosofii obshchestvennykh nauk " Spektorskyi writes: "When Kant decided to carry out a bold task to determine once and for all the constitutive elements of the evidential science of material nature, he essentially only translated the content of mathematical natural science of that time in the vague language of the school philosophy of that time. Critique of Pure Reason, taken from its naturalistic side, represents in the full sense a criticism, so to speak, a philosophical review, mainly on the genius creation of Newton" (Yevgenii Spektorskii, *Ocherki po filosofii obshchestvennykh nauk* [*Studies on Philosophy of Social Sciences*], number 1. Obshchestvennye nauki i teoreticheskaia filosofiia [Social Sciences and Theoretical Philosophy] (Warsaw, 1907), 207.

18 Yevgenii Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki" ["From the Area of Pure Ethics"], *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* 78 (1905): 385.

19 Ibid., 386.

20 See: Paul Natorp, "Kant und die Marburger Schule" ["Kant and the Marburg school"], *Kant-Studien* 17 (1912): 136.

21 Brigitte Falkenburg, "On Method: The Fact of Science and the Distinction between Natural Science and the Humanities," *Kant Yearbook* 12, no. 1 (2020): 2.

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The critical issue for the Neo-Kantians of the Marburg School was the "transcendental method," by which philosophical propositions are justified. Brigitte Falkenburg summarizes[22] Cohen's understanding of transcendental method in contrast to idealism in general and epistemology in four essential characteristics: first, from the "propositions of science" the transcendental method moves to their "presuppositions and foundations"; secondly, it reduces science, ethics, art, and religion to "historically proven facts" and their theoretical understanding in the context of culture and practical social life; next, it is interested in objective, a priori and scientific validity; and finally, its goal is to explore "synthetic propositions" which lay the basis a priori for scientific cognition. Thus, taking science or experience as a reference point (as the "facts" of knowledge), the Marburg philosophers turn science of experience into a problem and determine the logical prerequisites for their justification, formulating a "pure" basis for them. Therefore, scientism and a deep belief in the scientific nature of philosophy are some of the defining features of Marburg Neo-Kantianism.

As one of the founders of the Marburg movement, the educator and philosopher Paul Natorp (1854–1924) noted, the goal of philosophy is exclusively the creative work on putting together various objects and at the same time understanding and substantiating this work in its "pure" legal basis.

The approach to the problem of the "thing-in-itself," which the Neo-Kantians understand as a subject that is infinitely definable, always present, and never given in knowledge, seems extremely revealing for Neo-Kantians in general and the Marburg philosophers in particular. In their interpretation, the concept of "things-in-themselves" acquires a new meaning as the limiting concept, the "boundless task" of cognition, and the regulatory principle that unifies the multiplicity of experience. This approach allows Neo-Kantians to justify the processual nature and infinity of scientific knowledge and cultural creativity.[23]

In this context, it is worth considering in more detail the article *Iz oblasti chistoi etiki (From the area of pure ethics)* (1905) (described by the author as "the first characteristic of Marburg philosophy in Russian literature"[24]) by Spektorskyi, where the author presents the achievements of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism in ethics, focusing on its development as a rational science. At that time, this topic had already become the central topic of his scientific research. Spektorskyi's early works were significantly influenced by the Marburgers and contained a deep and professional understanding of the matter. According to contemporary researcher Tomas Nemeth, "Spektorskyi of 1905 certainly appeared to be one of the most promising lights of Russian Neo-Kantianism."[25]

Spektorskyi indicates that even though all human intellectual activity is closely related to ethics, it is far from achieving its proper realization as the reliable and

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22   Ibid., 6.

23   Natorp, "Kant und die Marburger Schule," 208.

24   Spektorskii, *Vospominaniya*, 131.

25   Thomas Nemeth, *Russian Neo-Kantianism: Emergence, Dissemination, and Dissolution* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2022), 224.

demonstrable realm of knowledge. However, the potential for developing "pure ethics" – like mathematics or mechanics – is significant. The scholar acknowledges Kant's exceptional contribution to this field and states that the philosopher did not "recognize it as a completely scientific problem" and did not correctly apply critical ethical guidelines, as he had done with mathematics and natural science. Nevertheless, the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism began to work with the core of Kant's philosophy, which, according to Spektorskyi, is "an objective, well-proven and reliable science. Its main method – transcendental – is the method of pure science, pure knowledge, i. e., knowledge that is completely free from any subjective, psychological, or even more so physiological features of the thinking of certain individuals, therefore completely as objective as the objective truth that two times two is four."[26] Spektorskyi contrasts the Marburgers with other interpreters of Kant's legacy, who reduced his teachings to psychologism, which affirms the illusory nature of sensual existence and the existence of mystical things-in-themselves. The aforementioned connection between Kant and science was ignored, leading to interpretations that declared the philosopher to be a metaphysician and a dogmatist, which, according to Spektorskyi, is precisely the opposite of the essence of his teaching.

He believed the merits of the Marburg Neo-Kantians to be quite significant: they restored and deepened Kant's connection with Newton and mathematical natural sciences; interpreted the doctrine of space and time as an indisputable justification of the scientific objectivity of physics; and understood the thing-in-itself as an idea of the mind, regulatory for its knowledge of the world. As the scientist concludes, "in the interpretation of the Marburg school, Kant turned out to be a theorist not of metaphysical illusions, but of experience, although experience not in the sense of short-sighted empiricism <...>, but in the sense of bold, free, and autonomous research, clearly aware of its tasks and accepting nothing without proof."[27]

In addition to the Marburgers' achievements in theoretical philosophy, Spektorskyi draws attention to their work in the field of the history of philosophy. The scientist notes that their historical and philosophical studies are united primarily by idealism, "i. e., the critical establishment of autonomous synthetic principles for science, morality, and aesthetics."[28] In their explanations, the history of philosophy appears as the history of idealism, or as an account of how other philosophical systems inevitably gravitate towards it. This way of research focuses on how and to what extent the idealistic tendency as a factor of the unity of different philosophies manifested itself within them. For this purpose, "first of all, it is necessary to review the characteristics established by tradition, although far from always sufficiently justified, of individual philosophers, and to study their original writings."[29] Consequently, in this context, Spektorskyi mentions Hermann Cohen and August Stadler's study of Kant's

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26   Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 389.
27   Ibid., 390.
28   Ibid., 391.
29   Ibid., 392.

philosophy and Paul Natorp's research into Plato.[30] As the researcher notes, "… gradually, in a monographic way, the Marburg school establishes the unity and continuity of the idealistic tendency in the succession of philosophizing generations. Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant follow one path, and this path is the path of critical idealism."[31]

An important episode in the history of philosophy, as well as the history of idealism, is the philosophy of the Early Modern Age, which was studied by Natorp[32] and Ernst Cassirer. As for the latter, Spektorskyi was well acquainted with Cassirer's doctoral dissertation devoted to the philosophy of Leibniz,[33] as well as the first volume of the *work Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (The Problem of Knowledge in the Philosophy and Science of the New Age)* (1906),[34] which he repeatedly mentions in both parts of his book *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki v XVII stoletii*, as well as in other publications on this topic.

In his master's dissertation, Spektorskyi often refers to Cassirer as a researcher of early modern-age philosophy,[35] whom he met personally during his stay in Marburg.[36] Spektorskyi cites several sources[37] from Cassirer's work on the history of modern philosophy and science, which, for the first time, illuminates in a historical-philosophical context the figures of Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, Christian Huygens, and Isaac Newton and provides a broad picture of modern European thought, which culminated in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Discovering the names of these scientists in the history of philosophy, Cassirer is the first to analyze their philosophical concepts, scientific methods, and achievements and to prove their fundamental importance for the theory of knowledge.[38] Spektorskyi's interest in

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30 See: August Stadler, *Kants Teleologie und ihre erkenntnisstheoretische Bedeutung, eine Untersuchung* (Berlin, 1874); Paul Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre: eine Einführung in den Idealismus* (Meiner, 1902).

31 Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 393.

32 See: Paul Natorp, *Decartes Erkenntnisstheorie. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Kriticismus* (Marburg, 1882).

33 See: Ernst Cassirer, *Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen* (Marburg an der Lahn: G. Elwert, 1902). In addition, Spektorskyi mentions this book in both volumes of his monograph, see: Spektorskii, *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki*, vol. 1: 70, 96, 231, 251, 440; vol. 2: 326. Also there is a mention in Yevgenii Spektorskii, *Ergard Veigel, zabitii ratsionalist XVII veka* [*Erhard Weigel, the forgotten rationalist of the 17th century*] (Tipografiia Varshavskogo uchebnogo okruga, 1909), 68.

34 See: Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, Band I (Berlin, 1906). Besides, Spektorskyi cited the second volume of this research (see Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, Band II (Berlin, 1907)) in both volumes of his investigation on the matter: Spektorskii, *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki*, vol. 1, 129, 178; vol. 2, 493.

35 See: Spektorskii, *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki*, vol. 1, 116, 128, 173, 177, 374.

36 See: Spektorskii, *Vospominaniya*, 132, 143.

37 See: Spektorskii, *Problema sotcialnoi fiziki*, vol. 1, 124, 130, 183, 197, 198, 271.

38 See: Dimitry Gawronsky, "Ernst Cassirer: His Life and His Work," in *Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, Illinois: The Library Living Philosophers inc., 1949), 15.

Cassirer's work and references to it in research on social physics of the 17th century convincingly testify to the influence of the Marburg trend of Neo-Kantianism on him not only conceptually but also in terms of his understanding of the history of philosophy. In my opinion, the idea of a detailed examination of modern social physics came to Spektorskyi under the influence of neo-Kantianism. However, his research is already based on the methodological principles of genetic research on a wide range of cultural and historical-philosophical material.

Regarding Neo-Kantian social philosophy, Spektorskyi is sure that it is a "philosophy of humanism and enlightenment; it is faith in a person – at least in a possible and necessary person as a truly intelligent being."[39] According to him, reason is the basis and condition of good and virtuous behavior, which leads him to conclude that the need for enlightening education is the only way to approach the ideal of a person as such. It is crucial that such activity be carried out on a social, not just an individual, level, and Spektorskyi sees "pure ethics" as a conceptual guide in the implementation of such a project.

The need for "pure ethics" as the mathematics of social science: Spektorskyi criticizes Cohen

According to Spektorskyi, ethics should become the "mathematics of social science." This status presupposes the mathematical (logical) level of scientific reliability and provability of its principles: "Such principles must be derived from pure thought and depend solely on its laws"[40] and not on empirical data.

Scientific (or pure) ethics is possible "because it can achieve the same credibility as that intrinsic to exact and indisputable sciences."[41] Secondly, it is both theoretically necessary to form knowledge about society as a real science and practically necessary because, without scientific foundations, it is impossible to provide a reasonable basis for private and public life.[42] Since "a true solution to any problem is a scientific solution,"[43] only ethics, as a science, can truly solve ethical problems.

However, Spektorskyi notes that the attempts known to us from the history of philosophy cannot be called satisfactory. In particular, Kant, who achieved the most significant result, allowed a certain amount of psychologism and subjectivism, while leaving metaphysical elements in the moral sphere. This, in turn, later led to the emergence of the "psychological anthropocentrism" of Johann-Gottlieb Fichte, the

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39   Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 393.

40   Ibid., 385.

41   Yevgenii Spektorskii, "Problema chistoi etiki i ee dostovernost" ["The Problem of Pure Ethics and its Certainty"], no. 31, item 2, 1, fond 43: Spektorskyi Yevhen Vasylovych (1875–1919), Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library, Kyiv.

42   Ibid.

43   Ibid., item 3, 6.

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"misanthropic egocentrism" of Max Stirner, and the "overman" of Friedrich Nietzsche.[44] The unscientific attempts of the attempts by these thinkers to deprive ethics of heteronomy and grant it autonomy became, as Spektorskyi claims, a declaration of moral anemia. Instead, thinkers who followed the "unscientific" path chose a shaky basis for the autonomy of ethics beyond reason. For example, one such thinker was Jean-Marie Guyot, who postulated the "beginning of life" as the highest principle that limits the human will to instinct.[45]

Therefore, Spektorskyi poses the question: Is scientific ethics possible at all? There is no lack of arguments against it, but he asserts that all of them are refutable. First, reliable scientific truths are deontological, a characteristic shared by ethics as well. These are not metaphysical statements but rather methodological principles useful for any science. Secondly, "ethics, like mathematics, is a pure science, that is, a science whose reliability is transsubjective and therefore necessary,"[46] i. e., vital for social sciences, which are not sufficiently developed. Practically speaking, scientific ethics is necessary because, without it, the problem of the future is unresolvable.[47] Thus, ethics cannot be empirical; it is only a pure science with principles that have mathematical precision.

The well-known philosopher and jurist Bohdan Oleksandrovych Kistyakivskyi (1868–920), a Neo-Kantian of the Baden school who studied under Wilhelm Windelband at the University of Strasbourg,[48] also puts forward the demands of objectivity and irrefutability to ethics: "…a moral principle in its very meaning is unchangeable and unconditional. It establishes not what must be done, but what a person creates when they fulfill their duty."[49] The significance of an ethical principle is akin to that of a scientific truth, which retains its validity under any circumstances and, as a scientific law, can only be discovered, not created. The essence of this principle is the distinction between good and evil. Furthermore, it applies only to human reality because it is "the principle of establishing differences and evaluation, the principle of

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44   Ibid., item 1, 7–11.

45   Ibid., 13–16.

46   Ibid., item 2, 2.

47   See ibid., 3.

48   At the same university, in March 1899, Kistyakivskyi defended his thesis "Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen." Eine methodologische Studie" ("Society and the Individual. A Methodological Study"), written under the supervision of Windelband , for which he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. In this work and later works Kistiakivskyi carried out a critical study of the methodology of social science from a Neo-Kantian standpoint, emphasizing the expediency of turning to the principles of scientific idealism, the main of which he considered the norms of what ought to be in theoretical thinking and practical activity, as opposed to the necessity of nature and natural sciences.

49   Bogdan Kistyakovskii, "Sotsialnie nauki i pravo. Ocherki po metodologii sotsialnikh nauk i obshchei teorii prava" ["Social Sciences and Law. Studies on Methodology of Social Sciences and General Theory of Law"], in Bogdan Kistyakovskii, *Izbrannoe* [*Selected Works*], vol. 1, ed. by A. N. Medushevskii (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010), 247.

moral activity and cultural construction, it is the principle of obligation."[50] Kistiakivskyi defines this principle as Kant's categorical imperative, which provides a scientific and philosophical basis for the moral principle, originally expressed in the Gospel commandments not to do to others what one does not wish for oneself and to love others as oneself.

This principle's high level of formality raises the question of how an ethical system can be built on such a basis. Kistiakivskyi answers that "a philosophical thought does not create the ethical system by itself"[51] nor by the individual efforts of the will of a particular person. The ethical system is the result of the creativity of a cultural society. According to Kistiakivskyi, ethical action connects the ethically appropriate and the real, which together create social and cultural reality: "From the totality of ethical actions and the organization they are connected with, a special kind of life, namely cultural society, is created."[52] This cultural society is a world of values and culture that surpasses and outgrows the natural environment. On this basis, Kistyakivskyi criticizes those idealists who sharply contrast what is and what ought to be and refers to Cohen and his three-volume work *System der Philosophie (System of Philosophy)* (1902–1912) as the most successful demonstration that "pure ethics deals not so much with volitional decisions conditioned by a categorical imperative, as with a special kind of being created by ethical actions."[53]

Spektorskyi, drawing on the mainly scientific and philosophical direction of his early works, typical of the philosophizing of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, interprets and criticizes the second volume of the mentioned work by Cohen, first published in 1904 under the title *Ethik des reinen Willens (Ethics of pure will)*. At the center of the German philosopher's reasoning is the "ideal action" of the will, which is independent of the material world and the emotional life of an agent. However, this ideal action is also independent of the mind, which, Spektorskyi asserts, inevitably leads the author to psychologism.[54]

Considering other works on this topic by Spektorskyi, it is essential to clarify the philosopher's position on psychologism. Spektorskyi writes that psychology "… studies the mental life of given subjects in their individuality,"[55] explaining certain phenomena by referencing their individual or collective nature. The content of psychology cannot be universal, although it, like any other science, uses universal forms of logic because "logic is the self-knowledge of scientific thought on the side of its form – not on the

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50   Ibid., 246.

51   Ibid., 250.

52   Ibid., 252.

53   Ibid., 253.

54   See: Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 397.

55   Yevgenii Spektorskii, "Ob obektivnosti, dostovernosti, edinstve nauki i ob obshchestvennykh naukakh. Zametki" ["On Objectivity, Certainty and Unity of the Science and on Social Sciences. Notes"], no. 33, 1, fond 43: Spektorskyi Yevhen Vasylovych (1875–1919). Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library, Kyiv.

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side of genesis or emergence, and therefore it is not identical with psychology."[56] The psychological point of view focuses on the subjective, and the psychological examination "…by itself never leads to objectivity," as it consists precisely of "finding one or another subjective basis and explanations for everything that has been accepted and accepted now as objective.[57]

Spektorskyi insists that from the point of view of scientific idealism, the main focus should be a goal, not an action, as Cohen claimed: "Only they, i. e., goals can be completely ideal and only they can be established with perfect purity and transparent clarity."[58] Reality itself lacks a goal; it is assigned by science, and through goals, people modify the material of reality to indicate the direction of changes and, therefore, this direction is formal.[59]

The connection between logic and ethics is also problematic because the former, for Cohen, is the logic of only natural science.[60] However, the moral world and natural reality are reconciled through a "primary law of truth" ultimately established by God. For Spektorskyi, in the early period of his career, such a postulate was unacceptable because scientific ethics was possible and necessary for him, and logic, which plays an essential role in its justification, was the same for morality and natural science.

It is essential to clarify that Spektorskyi considered logic "the science of universal and necessary objective conditions of our thought"[61] and regarded it as a transsubjective basis for understanding and argumentation in science, as well as a guarantee of objectivity. A thought in logic has an anonymous, impersonal character since "…a logical thought is not a manifestation of the thought of a particular subject."[62] Logical truths are naturally necessary, and genuinely scientific statements should be the same: "and outside of logic, science does not know necessity."[63] This principle is true for both natural and social sciences. Necessity and objectivity in science are provided purely formally – by ideas that play a leading role in processing empirical material. Thus, logic, as a science of forms of scientific thinking, serves as a guarantee of the objectivity of knowledge because its laws are necessary and universally binding: "The problem of the objectivity of science is the problem of universality and necessity, that is, objectivity, which means regularity, meaning the universality of the forms of our thought. In other words, it is a problem of logic."[64]

On the other hand, according to Cohen, ethics needs a "positive scientific fact" (for logic, it is mathematics and natural science based on it), and he considers

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56   Ibid., item 3, 3.
57   Spektorskii, "Entciklopediia," 114–115.
58   Ibid.
59   See ibid., 175.
60   See: Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 398.
61   Spektorskii, "Ob obektivnosti," 1.
62   Ibid.
63   Ibid., 2.
64   Ibid., item 3, 2.

jurisprudence and legal action to be such a fact.[65] So, if we generalize Cohen's scheme, the analog of mathematics in natural science would be jurisprudence in the moral sciences, and its logic would be ethics.

Kistiakivskyi approved of Cohen's attempt to orient ethics towards jurisprudence: "… when Cohen orients his ethics towards dogmatic jurisprudence, he also orients it to the law itself, which is active, implementing and determining the life of modern societies." [66] This observation is significant in the history of jurisprudence since scientific knowledge for Cohen became the material for building a philosophical system, and "now philosophy also felt the need to seek support in scientific knowledge produced by one of the branches of the science of law."[67] Kistiakivskyi thus concludes about the empirical nature of the science of law and indicates the need for a critical review of its methodology.

For Spektorskyi, this approach is unacceptable: "… it is enough to recall the genesis of modern jurisprudence, and then it will become obvious that despite the assurances of legal dogmatists that they are engaged in mathematics, it is in the highest degree not mathematical."[68] Based on the genetic view of jurisprudence, he proves that the statement that jurisprudence is both historical and mathematically necessary is false. [69] The only thing that can be necessary in jurisprudence is a goal deduced from pure ethics. Pure ethics, based on logic, not metaphysics, should be considered mathematics; it should become the basis for jurisprudence, not vice versa: "Pure ethics cannot expect mathematical certainty from the modern fact of dogmatic jurisprudence. It must become moral mathematics and, in this way, serve as a synthetic principle of support for all legal understanding, providing the only possible point of view for a proper legal perspective, drawing its first foundations not from the vague "fundamental law of truth," otherwise called God, but from a transparent source of pure logic."[70]

Another of Cohen's thesis, which Spektorskyi does not accept, is that the state is a postulate of pure ethics. Using the same arguments to argue against the universality of legal science, he emphasizes the historical nature and relativity of certain state formations.[71] Cohen also writes about the idea of a legal state. However, for Spektorskyi, it is a step away from the purity and objectivity of ethics, as it means objectifying the historical phenomenon and attempting to confirm its universal significance.

To sum up, we could claim that the task of developing scientific ethics is not to provide ultimate answers to moral questions, which is impossible in the discourse of critical philosophy, but to show that the questions themselves can be asked and discussed in such a way as to provide logically arranged answers, while also emphasizing the rational nature of the issue.

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65   Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 401.

66   Kistyakovskii, "Sotsialnie nauki i pravo," 385.

67   Ibid., 386.

68   Spektorskii, "Iz oblasti chistoi etiki," 401.

69   See ibid., 401–7.

70   Ibid., 408.

71   See ibid., 409–12.

Unfolding the entire panorama of Neo-Kantianism is not the task of this article. However, drawing a parallel between Spektorskyi's reasoning and the later developments of Kant's ethics by representatives of communicative philosophy seems appropriate. We assume that the scientist's reasoning, based on Kant's formal ethics and the consistent and critical development of the latter, finds confirmation in much later statements of discursive ethics by modern German philosophers Jürgen Habermas (born in 1929) and Karl-Otto Apel (1922–2017).

Thus, Spektorskyi assures that a judgment that claims to be scientific must meet the following requirements: "If a free judgment claims universal recognition, it must possess such properties that other minds, subjecting it to the same free discussion, could not help but recognize it as obligatory for themselves."[72] The common ground for such a discussion is logic, equally valid for mathematics and moral judgments. Thus, ethics should be based on universal rational principles (not conditioned by tradition and authority, as in jurisprudence), similar to those expected in social and natural sciences, and reflected by philosophy. The validity of certain statements (including ethical ones) must withstand the test before the "court of logic" – which is transsubjective and common to all intelligent people.

In 1999, Apel emphasized that "… since argumentation presupposes unrestricted cooperation of co-subjects of thought, it becomes clear that it also presupposes fundamental ethical norms."[73] The German professor emphasized that the theory of truth, assumed in this context, denies any conventional truth because the conditions of discourse are fundamentally formal, allowing them to precede any actual discussion.[74]

In this connection, let us also mention Habermas's reasoning on morals and morality, expressed in 1994: "The higher-level intersubjectivity characterized by an intermeshing of the perspective of each with the perspectives of all is constituted only under the communicative presuppositions of a universal discourse in which all those possibly affected could take part and could adopt a hypothetical, argumentative stance toward the validity claims of norms and modes of action that have become problematic."[75] As we can see, the basis of the legitimation of moral norms, once again, is the rational argumentation of the participants in the discourse.

Therefore, the main idea of Spektorskyi's "scientific ethics," which to some extent anticipates the ideas of discursive ethics as developed by Apel and Habermas, consists of the development of ethical issues on a rational basis. The main property of moral statements is achieving such a degree of logical reliability that it would allow everyone in an ideal community to reach the same conclusions independently (based on logic). Representatives of communicative philosophy focus on the communicative language

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72   Spektorskii, "Entciklopediia," 111–2.

73   Karl-Otto Apel, *The Response of Discourse Ethics to the Moral Challenge of the Human Situation as Such and Especially Today (Mercier Lectures, Louvain-la-Neuve, March 1999)* (Peeters Publishers, 2001), 47.

74   See ibid., 45.

75   Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, transl. Ciaran Cronin (The MIT Press, 1994).

component of argumentative procedures and the role of understanding; thus, searching for such direct analogies in Spektorskyi's writings would be an anachronism. However, the belief in the exclusive role of logical argumentation and the justification of ethics through extremely formal ideas is closely connected, in our opinion, with the explorations of the three mentioned philosophers.

Ethical, moral, social: instructions of the mind in the drama of social reality

It is not by chance that Spektorskyi analyzes the ideas of Kant and the Neo-Kantians in the context of social philosophy and ethics, as this topic was significant for the philosopher and was actively developed throughout his scientific career. The reception of Neo-Kantianism is relatively easy to trace in the early works of Spektorskyi,[76] which were focused on issues of critical philosophy and sciences, particularly social ones, which the philosopher often summarized with the term "ethics" ("... for ethics, i.e., legal, political and economic sciences..."[77]), emphasizing their moral character.[78] The defining feature of the social sciences, distinguishing them from the natural sciences, is the view of humans as ethical and free beings. Since humans are moral beings, they "exceed the point of view of natural science and cause the need for a special point of view and a special science – moral or social science."[79]

Spektorskyi must use the terms "social" and "moral" for a group of sciences that focus on the world of humans instead of nature. He understands social life and the history of science as a "drama," as a non-linear and essentially chaotic process: "Real life – both social and mental – is full of drama and contradictions and knows no absolute peace. Even science does not know it."[80] In society, inconsistencies between legal norms, political forms, and economic interests inevitably arise, which is a condition for the constant movement of social life. At the same time, the philosopher especially emphasizes that this movement "has the meaning not of a mechanical or organic process, but of a moral drama."[81]

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76   For more detail see: Oksana Slobodian, "Retseptsiia idei marburzkoho neokantianstva u rannii period tvorchosti Yevhena Spektorskoho" ["Reception of the Marburg Neo-Kantianism Ideas in the Early Works by Yevhen Spektorskyi"], *Naukovi zapysky NaUKMA. Filosofiia ta relihiieznavstvo* 2 (2018): 35–42. https://doi.org/10.18523/2617-16782153214.

77   Spektorskii, "Entsiklopediia," 12.

78   See ibid.

79   Yevgenii Spektorskii, "O zadachakh obshchestvovedeniia" ["On Assessments of Social Science"], *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* 72 (1904): 152–3.

80   Spektorskii, "Entsiklopediia," 113.

81   Yevgenii Spektorskii, "Vstupitelnoe slovo k lektsiyam i zanyatiyam seminara po filosofii" ["An Introductory Word for Philosophy Lectures and Seminars"], 1910s, No. 15, 3, Fond 43: Spektorskyi Yevhen Vasylovych (1875–1919). Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library, Kyiv.

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If using the term *social* for sciences does not require explanation, then with regard to *morals,* Spektorskyi justifies his choice. In his opinion, moral sciences should have precisely this name because it most fully conveys their essence and difference from physical sciences – in contrast to such options as "spiritual," "cultural" sciences, or "sciences about life."[82] On this point, the philosopher criticizes the naming and interpretation of human sciences by critical representatives of the Baden school of Neo-Kantianism.

Developing Windelband's theses from the famous work *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (History and Natural Science)* (1894), Rickert argued against the usual division of disciplines into sciences of nature and sciences of "spirit," by distinguishing the material and formal difference between the two types of sciences. First, Rickert contrasts the concept of culture with the idea of nature.[83] Thus, the very concept of significance is the basis for distinguishing between natural and cultural objects, where culture appears as something that is directly created by the purposeful activity of a person or consciously elevated by them.[84]

Formally, the philosopher contrasts nature not with culture but with history as logical concepts, meaning one reality is considered from different points of view. In comprehending reality and creating scientific concepts by science, Rickert discusses the generalizing method of natural science and the individualizing method of history.[85] The first method involves finding a common feature in a set of objects that is repeated in each of them; in contrast, in the second method, some objects are considered from the point of view of the individuality of each and the discovery of such features that have not been observed before.[86]

Spektorskyi considers the concept of culture problematic in the philosophy of Windelband and Rickert because, in his opinion, it is not sufficiently clearly defined in their works. The scientist concludes that for them, it is "just human history, and especially "idiographic," that is, descriptive, dealing with non-repeating personalities and events." [87] At the same time, the Baden Neo-Kantians recognize the existence of ideography in the physical sciences, which further confuses the matter. In principle,

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82   Thus, according to Spektorskyi, Dilthei's term "sciences of the spirit" contains too many possible meanings of the term "spirit," which is often understood substantively. Psychic reality is the boundary between physical and moral sciences, therefore it cannot be a defining feature of human sciences, and the concept of "life" for Spektorskyi is too vague a concept, close to biology.

83   See: Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1926), 14.

84   Ibid., 18.

85   Ibid., 54.

86   See ibid., 55.

87   Yevgenii Spektorskii, "Voprosy kritiki i teorii obshchestvennikh nauk. Ocherk podgotovlennii k II izd." ["The Issues of Critique and Theory of Social Sciences. A Study Prepared for the 2nd Edition"], the 1910s, no. 32, item 2, 14, fond 43: Spektorskyi Yevhen Vasylovych (1875–1919). Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library, Kyiv.

such an understanding of culture and the "sciences about culture" is unacceptable for Spektorskyi since it obliges one "to limit the range of sciences about the human world exclusively to empirical, descriptive sciences and fundamentally denies the possibility of abstract and rational sciences about this world – sciences that, as expressed by Windelband and Rickert, are "nomothetic."[88] Thus, these philosophers ignore such sciences as jurisprudence, economics, sociology, and even ethics, which, as Spektorskyi is convinced, can and should build their laws with the precision of mathematics. In addition, the concept of evaluation and value, which underpins the sciences of culture as unique in contrast to the sciences of nature, in such a context, is exclusively subjective in Spektorskyi's view, and this threatens arbitrary statements in scientific discourse.

Spektorskyi's criticism of the concept of the "sciences of culture" and the methodology associated with them does not seem entirely fair to us. First, the problem arises in the scientists' ignoring of the material and formal aspects in Rickert's separation of the sciences of culture from the sciences of nature, which resulted in his "identification" of the concepts of culture (material) and history (formal). In addition, Spektorskyi is aware that the Neo-Kantians recognize the use of the idiographic method in the sciences of nature but, for some reason, he does not pay attention to the opposite process – the use of the generalizing method in the sciences of culture, which Rickert writes about in the context of using general concepts in the study of cultural phenomena.[89] Among the latter, Rickert cites several examples of research in the sciences of culture, where generalizing concepts occur frequently and which Spektorskyi considers unfairly excluded from the circle of cultural sciences: linguistics, political economy, and jurisprudence. Furthermore, Rickert emphasizes the distinction between the concepts of value and evaluation.[90] According to Rickert, recognizing the significance and correlation with the value of a particular phenomenon is the basis of historical science because it allows one to distinguish those cultural facts on which the historian directs their research from the general flow of events. Instead, evaluating a specific significant phenomenon as bad or good is not implied and, therefore, cannot characterize the historical method or science.

Thus, Spektorskyi criticism of the definition of the humanities as a science of culture, which Windelband and Rickert substantiated, needs to consider several principle theses that the German philosophers put forward. At the same time, the "sciences of culture" of the Baden Neo-Kantians and the "moral sciences" as Spektorskyi understood them, have a common basis – the human being as the creator of an inevitable reality that is not identical to the natural one. This conceptual rapprochement was especially manifested in Spektorskyi's works from the emigrant

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88   Ibid., item 2, 14.

89   See Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 106–7.

90   See ibid., 87.

period, which are centered around the issues of Christianity as the basis of culture and social reality.[91]

Regarding the methodological foundations of the moral sciences, according to Spektorskyi, social science, as well as natural science, must establish different types of relationships and cause-and-effect relationships, "but this relationship in social science should no longer be between physical causes and physical consequences, or between physical causes and moral means, but between moral causes and moral consequences..."[92] This refers, in particular, to the cause-and-effect relationship between societal moods and legal norms, material economic interests, or political factors, etc.

Kistiakivskyi also emphasizes the fundamental difference between the paradigm of thinking about nature and society, considering this issue through the lens of the categories of "necessity" and "justice." He interprets these categories entirely in the Kantian paradigm as a human way of understanding nature and society: necessity applies to both natural and social phenomena, while justice covers only social phenomena. Since social phenomena occur only in interpersonal interaction, "everything that concerns people and takes place among them can and should be judged from a moral point of view, establishing the justice or injustice of one or another phenomenon." [93]

A vital guide and criterion for such changes and the assessment of the "empirical reality of social manifestations"[94] is the idea of society. As Spektorskyi specified in his Warsaw course of lectures, "society" is a synthetic concept. It encompasses individuals and does not have a separate existence beyond them: "... society, as an idea or a principle, is a unity of autonomous persons."[95] However, the idea of society has theoretical and solid practical significance. As Spektorskyi notes, "If we clearly and consciously set before us the problem of society, as a guiding principle for our understanding and behavior, we could turn out to be judges of our past and demiurges, builders of our entire future." [96] Thus, a clear understanding of society is necessary to assess the past. The regulative idea for social science is also fundamental because it legitimizes the reasonable arrangement of human coexistence. Therefore, the development of the most objective, reliable, and universal idea of society is one of the most critical tasks for the human mind: "All other achievements of the sciences, whether natural or social, as well as the whole civilization, have meaning only as preparatory studies for this task."[97]

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91   For more detail see: Oksana Krupyna, "Confirmation of the Spiritual Nature of Individual and Society in Yevhen Spektorskyi's Works of the Emigrant Period," *Naukovi zapysky NaUKMA. Filosofiia ta relihiieznavstvo* 13 (2024): 57–66. https://doi.org/10.18523/2617-1678.2024.13.57-66.

92   Spektorskii, "O zadachakh obshchestvovedeniia," 153–4.

93   Kistyakovskii, "Sotsialnie nauki i pravo," 186.

94   Ibid.

95   Spektorskii, "Entciklopediia," 167.

96   Ibid., 164.

97   Ibid., 160.

Like Spektorskyi, Kistiakivskyi emphasizes the theoretical importance of a rational understanding of social processes and the fundamental role of knowledge and the assessment of social life for its practical improvement. In his opinion, humanity, in general, strives for the realization of the ideal of justice because "the desire for justice is inherent in humans always and everywhere," so there is a need not only to contemplate what is just but also to believe that the idea of justice must be embodied in life.

According to Kistiakivskyi, the human world and its social life are no less complex and multifaceted than the world of nature. Therefore, the principle of finding simple and necessary connections, which leads to discovering laws, also applies to social phenomena. For this, it is required to "... establish, first of all, such causal relations between social phenomena that can be assigned the predicate of being unconditionally necessary and possess the characteristics of spacelessness and timelessness."[98] According to the philosopher, such laws are already present in economic materialism and constitute its central, analytical part.[99]

Spektorskyi also raised the question of objectivity in studying various social phenomena. He notes that observation, induction, and generalization are widely used in social science. However, "the path of logical proof is rarely used in it and is even rejected by the majority of specialists."[100] We seek to understand social life not abstractly and generally, but concretely and in detail, accounting for its historicity, considering the positive and negative phenomena. A classic example of this application of observation, induction, and generalization is provided by Aristotle in his "Politics." His hypotheses regarding the future were strictly empirical and did not consider the timeless ideal. Such hypotheses illuminate the material in various ways. However, they cannot claim the exclusive or exhaustive meaning of "a single, logically necessary, categorical truth, or law in the strict sense of the term."[101]

Judgments about the future, based on observation, are guidelines for achieving specific goals, for instance, in politics, where Aristotle's reasoning about tyranny and Niccolò Machiavelli's reasoning about the ruler are considered classic. However, according to Spektorskyi, the scientific perspective on the future is not limited to such predictions. He claims that being at the level of description and generalization of empirical phenomena, social scientists do not realize the full potential of this science because "the rules of everyday wisdom and empirical observation of people's actions, which have been accumulated since ancient times, although they bear the proud name of moral philosophy, do not advance at all the question about the

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98   Ibid., 162.
99   For example, the specified characteristics are characteristic of the law of commodity production, the causal relationship between wages and labor intensity, etc. The development of this aspect of economic materialism, according to Kistiakivskyi, should lead to the revival and such a level of development of classical political economy, when its laws become laws in the same sense as in natural science.
100   Spektorskii, "O zadachakh obshchestvovedeniia," 155.
101   Ibid., 157.

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possibility of accurate and reliable moral science, about its tasks and methods of implementation."[102] Instead, social scientists need to develop the rational truth of what ought to be, and not only what is, which, according to Spektorskyi, "opens a rational path to objectivity for them, namely the path of logical proof. It is impossible to show what is objectively necessary in empirical reality, but it is possible – and here the problem lies – to prove it."[103] What ought to be consistent with the laws of logic can be proven with the reliability of mathematical formulas; on this basis, we evaluate the past and try to predict the future by analyzing the probability of different possibilities, that is, by identifying specific trends. Certain practical guidelines for social practices do not exhaust the scientific potential of social science, and "among the problems that preoccupy social scientists, the problem of social goals or tasks of any social activity should occupy its rightful place."[104]

As Spektorskyi emphasizes, the ideas of what ought to be do not need to be invented; they have been present in culture for centuries, but they need philosophical criticism and purification from metaphysics. This particularly applies to justice – one of the most critical social ideas. The task of science is to develop the most objective, i.e., that which can be proven for everyone's understanding of justice, based on which it will be possible to give practical guidelines for social change. The latter constitutes the educational task of science: "With its resources, science can produce rather slow transformations, but they are the most durable. These are transformations in people's minds, in their way of thinking."[105] It is necessary to consciously set not individual but social goals.

Thus, according to Spektorskyi, based on rationally and critically understood ideas, scientific politics (legal, state, and economic) is possible ("teaching about social goals and means for their implementation by state bodies"[106]). Social science itself as a science is called upon to introduce rational truths into the life of society in its various dimensions because "to deny a priori the possibility of social sciences means acknowledging the impotence of science, its inability to shed light on a person as a moral being, that is, on what is closest to us and cannot fail to interest us deeply."[107]

Spektorskyi science project is based on the understanding of humans as rational beings capable of goal-setting and sensible arrangements in social life, which, in our opinion, resembles Kant's concept of anthroponomy. A Ukrainian researcher of the heritage of the German philosopher, Viktor Kozlovskyi, outlined the essence of this little-explored concept of Kantian philosophy, emphasizing that the basis of anthroponomy is not experience but the universal ability of humans to create norms based on reason. In this context, it refers to the a priori principles of reason and its rule-making and constitutive activity, which to some extent is opposed to external

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102   Spektorskii, "Ob obektivnosti," item 6, 5.
103   Spektorskii, "O zadachakh obshchestvovedeniia," 159.
104   Ibid., 158.
105   Spektorskii, "Entciklopediia," 176.
106   Ibid., 177.
107   Spektorskii, "Problema chistoi etiki," item 7, 1.

historical circumstances to a certain extent. However, this constitutive activity is aimed at public existence. Kozlovskyi notes that "despite its a priori nature, the anthroponomic model does not cover all dimensions of the intelligible nature of a human, since it concerns only one feature inherent in their nature, namely the legislative and rule-making activity of the human mind, which aims to normalize common human existence, and in such a way that the norms and rules of public life created by it (the mind) do not destroy the most important basis of human existence – their freedom."[108]

Creating norms through the mind is aimed at a specific ideal state of affairs, which is a priori unattainable. However, this norm-making and law-making still makes sense, as it directs the creation of a civil order toward the one that will enable people to live together based on freedom. An important point emphasized by the researcher is the priority of the legislative mind over the subjective mind in order to create the most acceptable political and legal order.[109]

In conclusion, Kant's and Neo-Kantians' ideas are undoubtedly present in Spektorskyi's legacy both as a theoretical framework for his research in philosophy and the history of social sciences and as an object of his critique. The search for the proper scientific method, objective foundations of science, and ways to implement its achievements into social reality, with a human as a free and reasonable being serving as the central actor of both science and this reality, are significant points that connect Kant and the Neo-Kantians of both schools and different generations with Yevhen Spektorskyi, a philosopher and methodologist of social science.

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108   Viktor Kozlovskyi, "Kantova antroponomiya, abo vchennya pro lyudinu yak normotvorchu istotu" ["Kant's Anthroponomy or Human Doctrine as a Rule-Proclaiming Creature"], *Naukovi zapiski NaUKMA. Filosofiya ta religieznavstvo* 141 (2013): 47.

109   Ibid., 48.

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