The Reception of Graham Harman’s Philosophy in Polish and Ukrainian Scholarship

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Abstract
The article aims to explore the ways in which scholars from Poland and Ukraine engage with Graham Harman’s philosophical work. The introductory part briefly describes Harman’s ontology and demonstrates the link connecting Harman with Polish and Ukrainian intellectual environments. Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO) states that objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality and cannot be reduced either to what they are made of or to what they do, that is, either to their constituents or to their effects. The connection with Poland and Ukraine goes back to the theory of objects suggested by the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski, whom Harman names among the predecessors of his ontology and who influenced both Polish and Ukrainian intellectual milieus. The next part of the article examines the history of the reception, identifying its key events and publications. The reception in Poland proves to be much more substantial than in Ukraine. A common tendency is determined: a conflation of Harman’s OOO and speculative realism by mistakenly ascribing the features of the former to the latter (broader concept), which suggests that speculative realism is being received through the lens of Harman’s project. The next part establishes the key discursive points that are used to map Harman’s ideas within the contemporary philosophical landscape. They can be summarised by the terms antianthropocentrism and antireductionism. The final part analyses the strategies for applying Harman’s theory showing that it can become the lens for interpretation and direct our attention to nonhumans and the hidden, inexplicable dimension of things or provide an ontological grounding for semi-literary and literary discourses. The methodology of this application, though, needs further development and clarification. Overall, in Poland, two of Harman’s books and two articles have been translated, and at least two books, one Ph.D. dissertation, and around two dozen articles discuss or apply his ideas. Apart from philosophy, his OOO is used for discussing literature, video games, films, humanities in general, education, management processes, antique studies, and ecocriticism. In Ukraine, one of Harman’s articles has been translated, and around ten articles and one collective monography engage with his philosophical project. Some of the Ukrainian works also apply Harman’s OOO in contexts that are not strictly philosophical, namely, in literary criticism, urban studies, film studies, and humanities in general. This paper can be of use to researchers studying OOO and its reception in different countries. In addition, it can help Ukrainian and Polish scholars who want to discuss or use OOO to familiarize themselves with the previous reception in their countries, thus facilitating domestic philosophical interaction.

Key Words: Graham Harman, object-oriented ontology, speculative realism.

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Introduction

Graham Harman’s philosophy is the product of a peculiar symbiosis in the domain of contemporary philosophy. His ability to combine things by freely incorporating drastically divergent philosophical traditions, ideas, and names in his discourse has gained him the interest of a vast number of readers, yet simultaneously creating certain suspicions among academic philosophers. Harman is named among the most influential contemporary philosophers and has also achieved institutional success. He is the editor of two book series and editor-in-chief of the peer-reviewed journal Open Philosophy. Harman’s works are extremely thought-provoking. Even when one is not persuaded to become a devoted Harmanian, one can be inspired to think through the most difficult and fundamental questions of philosophy in the daring spirit of classic philosophers. This makes it interesting to study how his ideas resonate with the researchers who deal with them, which brings us to the aim of this article – exploring the ways in which scholars from Poland and Ukraine engage with Harman’s work.

A thread that historically connects Harman to the Polish and Ukrainian philosophical environments goes back to the end of the nineteenth century when Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), Polish philosopher and the founder of the Lviv-Warsaw School of philosophy, introduced the distinction between the concept and the object of a presentation to develop further the theory of mental acts formulated by his teacher Franz Brentano. Twardowski is among those whom Harman names as the predecessors of his own theory of objects, while Twardowski’s students include both Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals.

Unpacking this connection, let us briefly describe the foundations of Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO). He positions it as a subspecies of speculative realism, a heterogeneous philosophical movement whose relative unity consists in its opposition

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2 - #16 in the List of the most influential people in philosophy for the years 1990–2020 (AcademicInfluence.com)
- #75 most powerful influence in the international art world (ArtReview)
- among 50 most influential living philosophers (TheBestSchools.org).

3 "Speculative Realism" (Edinburgh University Press) and "New Metaphysics" (Open Humanities Press).

4 It should be noted, though, that Twardowski was born in Vienna, where he also defended his habilitation thesis On the Content and Object of Presentations – A Psychological Investigation (1894), which is considered to be his main work, and only later got a position at the University of Lviv (then Lemberg, Austro-Hungarian Empire; now Lviv, Ukraine, in Polish Lwów).

to the tendency, in the post-Kantian continental tradition, to abandon the questions about reality as it is, independently of the human being.6 The specific feature of OOO, which differentiates it from other approaches associated with speculative realism, is the account of objects as the fundamental building blocks of reality. According to OOO, an object is not reducible either to its constituent(s), or to its relations with other objects, particularly humans. Put another way, “an object is whatever cannot be reduced to either of the two basic kinds of knowledge: what something is made of, and what it does.”7 Anything that meets these requirements can be counted as an object. Thus, every object has an ontological primacy over its parts and effects, which means that it has an inaccessible and inexplicable “hidden” dimension.

To capture this irreducible nature of objects, Harman introduces a fourfold structure which, he argues, is characteristic of any object, even a fictional book character. This structure includes a real object, real qualities, a sensual object, and sensual qualities, and the various tensions between them constitute the metaphysical dimension of our reality.8 A sensual object and sensual qualities “exist only as the correlate of some real object, whether human or otherwise.”9 We might say that the “sensual” dimension is the way an object is given to another object. A real object (with its real qualities which it cannot be reduced to) is hidden behind this manner of givenness: it withdraws or withholds from any direct contact with other objects.

A sensual object is not reducible to its sensual qualities either. Harman finds the argumentation for the tension between sensual objects and sensual qualities in Husserl, although discussing his ideas in the context of Harman’s own theoretical problems and often in his own terms.10 Harman writes that, at least in one aspect, “[t]he object for Husserl is a unity over against its shifting series of outer accidental manifestations, since a house is the same house from no matter what direction or distance we view it.”11 The rift between sensual objects and sensual qualities in OOO is a counterpart to the Husserlian distinction between the intentional object and its accidental manifestations, or adumbrations (Abschattungen). It is here that Harman

6 Although the definition of speculative realism is often blurry and can vary among researchers, this concept remains present in academic literature; see, e.g., Vasyl Korchevnyi, “Spekuliatyvnyi realizm u konteksti suchasnoi filofofskoji dumky” [“Speculative Realism in the Context of Contemporary Philosophical Thought”]. Naukovi zapysky NaUKMA. Filosofiia ta relihiieznavstvo 6 (December 2020): 68–69, https://doi.org/10.18523/2617-1678.2020.6.68-80. Apart from Harman, the representatives of OOO include Timothy Morton, Ian Bogost, and – at one period of his work – Levi R. Bryant. Their approaches have certain differences, so when I speak about OOO in this article, I mean Harman’s version unless explicitly stated otherwise.
8 See Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 259–60.
9 Ibid., 80.
sees his link to Twardowski: Husserlian distinction between adumbrations and intentional objects can be viewed as an immanentized version of Twardowski’s distinction between the content and the object of a presentation.12

In his theory of intentionality, Brentano suggests that every mental act is directed to something within itself – an immanent object.13 Influenced by Brentano, Twardowski develops a distinction between the object and the content of a mental act. The object is something towards which a mental act is directed, something independent of the mental act itself. The content is the way in which the object is presented during the mental act.14 The content is dependent on the mental act and exists only inside it. Whereas the content can exist only inside the mind, an object is usually outside of it, unless the content of some presentation15 is considered or discussed, making it the object of another presentation.16 Rejecting the reference to “the outside”, Husserl transports Twardowski’s distinction into the immanent realm of consciousness. He does not consider the statements about the mind-independent “real” world as philosophically grounded, so both the object towards which the mental act is directed and the ways in which this object is given to consciousness are considered by him as immanent to mental acts.17 Harman sees the importance of this distinction in identifying the tension between the unified intentional objects and their multiple manners of givenness.18 Sensual objects and sensual qualities in his OOO are always correlates of real objects, their existence depends on something else. Thus, they resemble Husserlian, an immanent, version of this distinction. Meanwhile, Twardowski’s objects of presentation, being independent of the mental acts, have more similarities to Harman’s real objects.

As can perhaps already be seen, the philosophical motif uniting Twardowski and Harman is not limited solely to the indirect influence via Husserl19 but has also another component – an inclination to realism, that is, an intention to speak about the mind-

12 Ibid., 194.
14 Twardowski was not the first to propose this distinction, but he elaborated on it in his own distinct way. For instance, contrary to his predecessors, particularly Bernard Bolzano, he argued that “there are no objectless presentations, presentations without an object. …Even presentations of contradictory objects have both content and object.” Arianna Betti, “Kazimierz Twardowski,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, 1997. Article published Tue Jul 6, 2010; last modified Jul 13, 2023), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/twardowski/. Twardowski’s distinction is considered to be “a psychological, non-Platonistic counterpart of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference” (Betti).
16 Betti.
17 Husserl, as noted previously, uses other terms: adumbrations and intentional objects.
18 See the detailed discussion of this thread in Harman, Prince of Networks, 191–4.
19 For the presentation of parallels between Twardowski and Harman see also Magdalena Holy-Łuczaj, “Non-Anthropocentric Philosophy Between Object-Oriented and Thing-
independent “outside” world, a motif that is absent in Husserl as well as in a great portion of post-Kantian continental philosophy. Moreover, there is an important similarity in how Harman and Twardowski view the aims of their metaphysical projects. Harman cites Twardowski’s words that “metaphysics is a science which considers all objects, physical – organic and inorganic – as well as mental, real as well as nonreal, existing objects as well as nonexisting objects; investigates those laws which objects, in general, obey, not just a certain group of objects.”20 This sounds very fitting for Harman’s own philosophical project, which is a theory of objects in the most general sense, emphasizing the necessity of equal attention to any kind of object – be it natural or fictional.21 Harman attempts to find a place for such object-oriented ontological inquiry in the face of the contemporary predominance of the natural sciences22 and considers Twardowski to be doing something similar: “Like his better-known fellow student Meinong, Twardowski envisions a global theory of objects that would outflank the sciences, which focus too narrowly on one specific kind of object.”23

Thus, my task in this article becomes to examine how this circle of intellectual encounters is closing through the engagement with Harman’s thought among the researchers from Poland and Ukraine, which, in turn, is opening up new possibilities for productive discursive symbioses. I will cover three aspects of this engagement: the history of the reception, the key discursive points that are used to map Harman’s ideas within the contemporary philosophical landscape, and finally, the existing strategies for applying Harman’s theory.

History of reception

The reception of Harman’s works in Poland started with two significant events. The first of them was the appearance of the twentieth volume (2012) of Kronos quarterly dedicated to speculative realism24, and the second was a 2013 Polish translation25 of Harman’s book The Quadruple Object. In cooperation with the publishing house Fundacja Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego, Kronos has published translations of the works of Alain Badiou and Catherine Malabou, who are sometimes regarded as close to speculative realism. It has also translated all three of Quentin Meillassoux’s published

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21 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 9.
22 See ibid., 5–7.
23 Harman, Prince of Networks, 192.
24 However, an incidental engagement with Harman’s works in Andrzej W. Nowak, Podmiot, System, Nowoczesność (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, 2011) that took place earlier should be noted. See, for instance, pages 15–6, 20.
books, and it is worth mentioning that his book *After Finitude*, which is considered to be a catalyst for the emergence of speculative realism, was translated into Polish two years after Harman's *The Quadruple Object*. Thus, we can presume that it is Harman's thought that has had a decisive impact on the reception of speculative realism in Poland.

The *Kronos* volume dedicated to speculative realism included one article written by Harman specially for this occasion, one translation of his previously published key article “On Vicarious Causation,” and his conversation with Quentin Meillassoux. In the editorial introduction to the volume, Wawrzyniec Rymkiewicz, a chief editor of *Kronos*, writes that the group of speculative realists is the clearest sign of the changes that are happening now (meaning 2012) in philosophy, a shift that is not completely clear for those living in the epicenter of it. Trying to capture this change, Rymkiewicz deliberately uses such “imprecise, poetic expressions” as the “emergence of a new spirit” and the “prevailing of a new atmosphere.”

The next step was the translation of *The Quadruple Object*, Harman’s compendium of his ontology, the publication of which has influenced much of the later discussions and applications of Harman’s ideas. It was published in Polish in 2013 as *Traktat o przedmiotach* (lit. “Treatise on Objects”) and was discussed in five reviews.


The translation was by Marcin Rychter, who had previously translated Harman’s article “On Vicarious Causation” in the Kronos volume. Later Rychter also collaborated with Grzegorz Czemiel in the translation of Harman’s book on Bruno Latour.35

Rychter’s decision not to translate the title of the book directly, although agreed with Harman himself, was later criticized because the title of the Polish edition failed to convey the reference to Martin Heidegger’s “fourfold” (das Geviert) in the original.36 In the translator’s afterword, Rychter provides four reasons for his decision to change the title. Firstly, there is an unfortunate vocal association – the Polish word poczwórný (the direct counterpart of “quadruple”) sounds similar to the word poczwarný (“monstrous”). The second reason is Rychter’s intent to evoke the associations with Traktat o dobrej robocie (Treatise on Good Work)37 by Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbiński (a pupil of Kazimierz Twardowski) in order to “[remind] us of certain threads that bring these completely different authors together.”38 The third reason is the fact that a direct translation would not be instantly understandable to the average reader, and the fourth one is the wish to allude to the pre-Kantian fashion of using the word “treatise” for works aiming to ground a certain discipline, which, Rychter argues, makes this word suitable for the title of Harman’s book, since this work is not only


“a concise compendium of his ‘object-oriented philosophy’” but also considers the Kantian “Copernican Revolution” as a dead end.39

Critics of this decision usually mention only the first reason given by Rychter, apparently regarding it as the main one. In any case, even though the rest of his arguments might not be completely persuasive, the main counterpoint to the critics is still the fact that Harman did not object to this change. This suggests that the main issue raised by the critics – the disappearance of the reference to Heidegger – does not mean so much to the author. It might be the evidence that this reference, along with the whole presence of Heidegger in Harman’s work, is mostly instrumental – as Rychter puts it, “Harman approaches these authors as a bricoleur reaching for what is closest and using it for his own needs, usually completely contrary to the original purpose.”40

Moreover, such a change in the title is in full accordance with Harman’s ontology for which the translation of the book would mean the emergence of a new object, and it is not strange that a new object acquires a new name.

The Polish edition of The Quadruple Object includes not only the afterword, where, along with the translation issues, Rychter (in a quite sympathetic tone) discusses different aspects of Harman’s philosophy but also a foreword41 by the prominent Polish scholar Szymon Wróbel.42 The latter presents Harman’s project in the broader context

39 Rychter, 213. It should be noted, though, that Harman’s relation to Kant is far from being a simple rejection. The inaccessible dimension of objects in OOO, which was mentioned earlier, already alludes to the Kantian concept of the thing-in-itself. The complexity of this relation will be more apparent from the discussion of Harman’s attempt to universalize the Kantian rift between us and noumenon later in the article. This kind of quasi-dialectical rejection-dependence relation to Kant seems to be characteristic of speculative realism in general. Earlier, I metaphorically used psychoanalytical terminology to formulate this relation and suggested that Kant’s philosophy plays the role of the Law of the Father for speculative realists who try to rebel against Kant’s transcendental restriction. “But the body of the Father has already been devoured and internalized, thus determining the intellectual space of their transgressive gesture.” Korchevnyi, “Spekuliatywny realizm u kontekstuisuchasnolilioskoi dumky,” 73.

40 Rychter, “Posłowie Tłumacza: Poczwórny Harman,” 220. Rychter does not see that as a problem: “Harman’s original, sometimes breakneck interpretations do not have as their main goal the expansion of academic knowledge of these philosophers. Meta-language is not the proper element of this thought, but merely a workshop in which conceptual tools are produced and are later used to develop speculative metaphysical reflection that goes far beyond the context from which they were borrowed.” Rychter, 220. For a critique of Harman’s instrumental usage of Heidegger, see Holy-Łuczaj, “Przedmiot Poczwórnny,” 232–3; Zachariasz, “New Age w Filozofii,” 341.


of speculative realism. This foreword has become quite influential by providing the conceptual framework for later inquiries. In her review of the translation of *The Quadruple Object*, Polish researcher Magdalena Holy-Łuczaj writes that Wróbel’s way of presenting speculative realism may be more insightful than the one provided by Harman himself. The same goes for OOO: explained by Wróbel, Harman’s quadruple structure of an object seems to her “even more understandable than in Harman’s work.”\(^{43}\) Another Polish researcher, Sylwia Mieczkowska, relies on Wróbel’s interpretation when discussing Harman’s approach in her article and widely cites the mentioned foreword.\(^{44}\) So do Dominika Meyer\(^ {45}\) and Aleksander Wojciech Mikolajczak.\(^ {46}\)

However, Wróbel’s narrative, though thoughtful and insightful, contains a somewhat problematic use of the term “speculative realism”. It ascribes to this expression a meaning that is relevant only for some philosophers associated with speculative realism and not for others. Such a usage can also be found in texts that rely on Wróbel’s foreword. In his review, Marcin Lubecki writes, citing Wróbel, that the specific features of speculative realism are

its speculativeness (so it is not a naive variant), the idea of democracy (in the ontological sense) of objects, as well as irreductionism, which, according to Bruno Latour, consists in the fact that nothing can be reduced to anything else, nothing can be derived from anything else, but everything can be related to everything.\(^ {47}\)

Meanwhile, the belief that objects are essential to philosophy, as Agata Zborowska\(^ {48}\) rightly notes, is not shared by Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, and Ian Hamilton Grant, who along with Harman are considered to be the founders of speculative realism. Moreover, the implied close affinity between speculative realism

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\(^{43}\) Holy-Łuczaj, “Przedmiot Poczwórny,” 233. The author of another review, Marcin Lubecki, also does not question Wróbel’s narrative about Harman and speculative realism; see Lubecki, “Grahama Harmana Ontologia Przedmiotu Poczwórnego.”


\(^{47}\) Lubecki, “Grahama Harmana Ontologia Przedmiotu Poczwórnego,” 223.

\(^{48}\) Zborowska, “Przedmioty w Działaniu.”
and Latour’s thought would probably seem strange to Brassier who has taken much effort to criticize Latour’s approach. A similar problem with the meaning of “speculative realism” is present in Mieczkowska’s and Holy-Łuczaj’s articles, as well as among the authors who demonstrate less reliance on Wróbel’s foreword. Although Wróbel’s conceptual framework could be a plausible source of such confusion in usage, it should be mentioned that there is no consensus concerning the meaning of the term “speculative realism”, so it often acquires a meaning that is suitable for a specific scholar’s own research goals. Differences among philosophers associated with this label complicate its meaningful use, which was a reason for most of the “speculative realists” not to self-identify by this term; Brassier is especially critical of it. Since “speculative realism” in Polish works often involves a connotation to Harman’s object-oriented ontology, it is perfectly possible to explain this conflation through contingent historical circumstances, namely, the fact that Harman’s book was the first work of the “speculative realists” to be translated into Polish, which created a framework for interpreting the entire movement.

This tendency to conflate OOO and speculative realism was also apparent in the call for papers for the multidisciplinary academic conference “Cultural Studies and Speculative Realism” organized at Kraków’s Jagiellonian University in November 2015. The conference keynote speaker was Levi R. Bryant, at that time a proponent of onticology – his own version of OOO. In his reflections on the conference, he mentions “a disturbing tendency to equate speculative realism with object-oriented ontology as if they’re synonyms, and to treat object-oriented ontology as if it were

50 Mieczkowska, “Object-Oriented Ontology.”
synonymous with Graham Harman’s object-oriented phenomenology.” Thus, we see a tension not only inside speculative realism but also between the different representatives of OOO, which even prompts Bryant to suggest that “it is perhaps best to abandon these labels altogether, instead always referring to the proper name of the thinker you have in mind with these positions.” Such confusion is somewhat surprising since Harman himself points out these differences in *The Quadruple Object* as well as in other texts. Since the 2013 translation, Harman’s ideas have been discussed in more than twenty Polish academic articles and books, and many of them do not contain this terminological problem – mostly because they adhere to the strategy mentioned by Bryant, that is, referring to the proper names of thinkers rather than collective labels.

Compared to the Polish reception, Ukrainian engagement with Harman’s work has been significantly less visible and may be characterized as preliminary. There are around ten academic texts, the first of which dates back to 2017, and only one translation of a small article in 2019. The conflation of OOO and speculative realism exists here as well. It is also worth mentioning that Harman’s philosophy became a topic of a 2020–2021 course for Bachelor’s degree philosophy students of the V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. It was “Contemporary Western Philosophy” (in Ukrainian)

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by Illia Ilin (Ілля Ільїн⁵⁸), and according to the course program, OOO was one of its nine thematic constituents.

**Mapping Harman’s philosophical stance**

One of the most frequently recurring motifs in both Polish and Ukrainian scholarship on Harman is the struggle against anthropocentrism.⁵⁹ This is not surprising since Harman himself stresses the importance of acknowledging the ontological equality of every object, including humans. His opponent is the post-Kantian tradition of thought whose chief concern is the (in)capacity of human thought to access the world and the various mediators of this access. Focusing on these questions creates a fundamental dualism – a split between humans and the rest of the world.⁶⁰ The democratization of this split – that is, universalizing it and making it characteristic of the relations between any two entities (objects) – is one of the main ideas of Harman’s philosophy.⁶¹ This

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⁶⁰ “In all his works, … [Harman] repeats like a mantra that he wants to oppose the Kantian Copernican revolution, thanks to which the gap between man and the inhuman has become the main philosophical issue.” Rychter, “Posłowie Tłumacza: Poczówé Harman,” 216. In Harman’s words: ‘And in this way today’s ‘continental philosophy’ … joins analytic thought in a little-noticed sceptical/radical consensus in which the difference between Hume and Kant is not so great. Everything is reduced to a question of human access to the world, and non-human relations are abandoned to the natural sciences.’ Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 156. In this context, it is worth mentioning Karol Klugowski’s dissertation where he tries to reconcile Harman’s philosophy (as well as Meillassoux’s) with the linguistic turn and suggests interpreting the OOO from the standpoint of the philosophy of mind; see Karol Klugowski, “Krewanage Wizji Świata Jako Wyzwanie Dla Filozofii z Kręgu Realizmu Spekulatywnego” (PhD diss., Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 2021).

⁶¹ “Most post-Kantian philosophies have accepted some version of the German Idealist critique of Kant: it is impossible to think a thing outside thought, and therefore the concept of a thing-in-itself beyond thought is incoherent. By contrast, OOO fully accepts the Kantian thing-in-itself, and merely denies that it is something that haunts
makes his project antianthropocentric in its intention and inscribes Harman into the context of a broader tendency to decentralize the human, which consists in rejecting our exceptionality and turning towards the nonhuman, variously construed. In particular, it can mean eliminating dichotomies such as subject/object and nature/culture. This kind of antianthropocentric perspective can be found both in works that analyze Harman’s thought (often by comparing it to other philosophical positions) and in those that aim to apply it.

Rychter, for instance, says that the fundamental innovation of Harman’s philosophy lies “primarily in its radical antihumanism, which should probably be called posthumanism.” While the antihumanistic gesture of the philosophical “dethronement” of the human being, Rychter argues, is not Harman’s invention and can be found in various forms in Nietzsche, Heidegger, structuralists, poststructuralists, psychoanalysts, and postmodernists who were substituting a “hollow” concept of humanity with such categories as “will to power”, “structure”, “game”, “drive”, “power relations” or “discourse”), Harman’s posthumanistic thought decisively differs.

Twentieth-century antihumanism was focused on the “death” or the “end” of the human being, thus remaining dependent on the very category that it tried to abandon. Rychter uses here the expression “humanism à rebours”. Harman, on the contrary, no

human thought alone. Fire and cotton are also opaque to each other even if they are not ‘conscious’ in the same way as humans or animals.” Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 259.


63 Everyday things in their concealed depth, as in Czemiel’s “Istność Rzeczy”, artificial objects such as robots, as in Nataliia Sholukho’s “Estetyka tilesnosti v obiektno-orientovanii ontolohii (na prykladi serialu ‘Svit Dykoho Zakhodu’)” (”Corporeity Aesthetics in Object-Oriented Ontology (As Exemplified by the Television Series ‘Westworld’)”), Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriia filosofsko-politolohichni studii 23 (2019): 113–7, – those are the examples of the nonhuman that appear in the Ukrainian and Polish texts which employ Harman’s discourse.

64 For instance, Ukrainian researcher Vitalii Starovoit regards overcoming this dichotomy as one of the goals of Harman; see Starovoit, “’Transnoumenalizm’ ta obiektno-orientovana ontolohiia.”


67 Rychter uses the problematic concept of postmodernism without clarification.

68 Perhaps, more often, this position, characteristic for example for Foucault, is conceptualized – contrary to Rychter – as posthumanism. However, we can find similar account on the antihumanism-posthumanism distinction in Francesca Ferrando, “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Differences and Relations.” Existenz 8.2 (2013): 31–2.
longer “mourns” the death of the human being in any way. Unlike “postmodernists”, he does not “celebrate any limits or ends” – rather, he is oriented towards the future and is “designing a new metaphysics, the times of which are yet to come.”69 In this respect, Rychter calls him a “post-postmodernist”. Thus, the prefix post- in “posthumanism” ascribed to Harman by Rychter aims at conveying Harman’s stance towards the previous philosophical tradition – not only critique and rejection (as with anti-), which is essentially negative but an attempt for a positive new program, a new beginning.70 At the same time, Rychter acknowledges another dimension of Harman’s philosophy which consists in its quite old-fashioned character – an absolutely pre-Kantian ambition to build up an ontological system that speaks about “what is”. In this context, Rychter uses the word “hypermodernity.”71

Another way to terminologically grasp Harman’s relation to the human-centered worldview is the expression “non-anthropocentrism”72 or the somewhat paradoxical expression “non-anthropocentric humanities.”73 The prefix non- can suggest a contrast without a negative dependence as well as a link to the notion of a “nonhuman turn”, another widespread context for considering Harman’s views.74

Developing further the account of the prominent Polish posthumanist Ewa Domańska, Sylwia Mieczkowska depicts this shift towards the nonhuman as a series of interconnected turns – the “agency turn” and the subsequent performative, material, and speculative ones.75 She argues that the reason for such changes is that “the theoretical apparatus developed by “postmodern philosophers...” has ceased to respond to the problems of the present” – that is, ecological and political crises, the development of (nano/bio)technologies, and so on.77 These challenges have pushed researchers to “realize the need to move away from the central place of the subject in Western philosophy and the need to recognize new, nonhuman actors creating social reality.”78

70 It can be questioned, though, to what extent the prefix post- is suitable for conveying the meaning of something new, something oriented to the future.
72 See Holy-Luczaj, “Non-Anthropocentric Philosophy.”
73 See Wajzer, “Kaczka de Vaucansona.”
74 See Holy-Luczaj, “Non-Anthropocentric Philosophy”; Mieczkowska, “Object-Oriented Ontology”; Sholukho, “Estetyka tilestnosti.” Also, see Felczak, “Przyjemność Upodmiotowionych Przedmiotów,” 85, where Harman’s project is viewed in the context of attention to nonhuman actors.
75 Mieczkowska, “Object-Oriented Ontology,” section 2.
76 Mieczkowska’s use of this term seems unclear. At one point she mentions poststructuralism, narrativism, and constructivism in this context, and in another place, she writes: “Representatives of the main currents of twentieth-century philosophy, gathered under the collective name of postmodernists, usually limited themselves to research in epistemology, phenomenology or analytical philosophy.” Mieczkowska, “Object-Oriented Ontology,” section 2.
77 Ibid., section 2.
78 Ibid., section 2.
In her paper, Mieczkowska suggests an overview (as well as a critique) of Harman’s theory, noting that his work helps to rehabilitate objects and return them to the philosophical discourse, as well as to undermine the privileged position of the subject and point to the same ontological status of all beings, both human and nonhuman.  

As we see in the previous paragraph, Mieczkowska, in contrast to Rychter, considers “postmodernism” to be on the side of anthropocentrism. The argument she provides is that nonhumans appear in these discourses predominantly as “abstract, language-mediated concepts, detached from their physical essence,” while the nonhuman turn leads to the emancipation of things, which are no longer viewed as “only a background for human activity” but begin to “demand recognition of their agency.” However, especially given the unclear meaning of the term postmodernism in both cases, we can see this as a difference in the aspect that is stressed – both interpretations (Mieczkowska’s and Rychter’s) look at “postmodernist” philosophy (whatever they mean by it) from Harman’s perspective (or more generally, the perspective of the nonhuman turn), so they see “postmodernism” as still too anthropocentric.

A key role in “restoring” nonhumans in the humanities, Mieczkowska notes, has been played by the French sociologist Bruno Latour, whose actor-network theory criticizes the distinction between nature and culture and assigns agency also to nonhuman actors (or “actants”). Being an important figure for Harman, Latour is often mentioned in texts on Harman where they are both grouped as representatives of the philosophical trend that opposes anthropocentrism.

In her review dedicated to the three books that appeared in Poland in 2013 and were thematically close to the nonhuman turn, Zborowska points out that it is

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79 Ibid., section 5.
80 Ibid., section 2.
81 Ibid., section 2.
82 Ibid., section 2.
particularly Latour’s thought that connects them, “in various ways guiding projects oriented towards objects.” The approaches of the three authors differ a lot and operate in distinct disciplines – philosophy, sociology, and archaeology, respectively. It is this differentiation, though, that, according to Zborowska, proves the importance that recent interest in materiality has gained. Here, in addition to the concept of nonhuman turn (zwrot ... ku temu-co-nie-ludzkie), she also uses expressions such as “return to things” and “material turn.”

This brings us to another discursive neighbor of Harman’s OOO and speculative realism – new materialism. This is also an umbrella term whose scope is often hard to define. Together with OOO, new materialism belongs to the spectrum of contemporary antianthropocentric stances. This – despite many differences between them - unites Harman with Jane Bennett, one of the philosophers associated with new materialism. But what is distinct about Harman’s approach?

Its main specific feature is nonreductionism concerning concrete beings. As Polish researcher Andrzej Marzec puts it, “[b]oth materialism and the actor-network theory struggle with anthropocentrism, but neither is concerned with individual objects.” These movements, he argues, are in line with a widespread contemporary trend of emphasizing, or even absolutizing, relations and rejecting ontological independence of anything apart from relations. Through a materialist’s lenses, we are a flux of matter, a constant becoming; we change according to what we encounter. Latour’s actors operating inside networks are no more than their actions – the actors do not exist apart from their agency. Meanwhile, for Harman, Marzec continues, “realism consists in the fact that he recognizes the existence of real, autonomous objects, completely independent of human judgments, interpretations, as well as inter-objective relations and their appearances,” objects that always remain “withdrawn, unknowable in its real, ontological cavern.” This defines Harman’s

86 Zborowska, “Przedmioty w Działaniu,” 3.
87 Ibid., 2, 5.
88 Marzec, “Kino Zorientowane Ku Przedmiotom,” 92. Marzec talks there about speculative realism, but he wrongly ascribes to it the feature of OOO.
91 Marzec, 81. In Harman’s words: “[T]he interdisciplinary success of OOO allows us to view it instead as an extremely broad method in the spirit of actor-network theory, but one that rescues the non-relational core of every object, thus paving the way for an aesthetic conception of things.” Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 256. Harman broadly discusses Latour and materialism in various works. He distinguishes different kinds of materialism and criticize them for reductionism; see, e.g., Graham Harman, Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016); Graham Harman, “I Am Also of the Opinion That Materialism Must Be Destroyed,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28.5 (October 1, 2010): 772–90, https://
place in the antianthropocentric trend where a common enemy unites him with Latour, new materialism, and various instances of the nonhuman turn. What differentiates Harman from many others in this trend is his attempt to preserve a certain autonomy of things, their inaccessible dimension. For him, they cease to be mere effects of a more fundamental kind of being or mere sums of their relations or “actions.”

There is another distinctive feature of Harman’s project that makes it to some extent an outlier within the fight against anthropocentrism: the relatively sparse attention given to ethical problems or, speaking more broadly, issues of practical philosophy. Although Harman often adds some ethical fleur to his antianthropocentric stance, it seems that his argument on the ontological equality of humans and nonhumans is of a predominantly conceptual nature. As Hoły-Łuczaj notes, while contemporary posthumanism mostly aims at developing new ethics based on the human being’s new decentralized position, it is difficult to infer ethical implications from Harman’s Treatise.92 In her later work, Hoły-Łuczaj argues that his OOO is not properly equipped for the nonhuman turn since Harman does not draw a firm ontological distinction between fictional and material objects. For Hoły-Luczaj, the problem with this kind of ontology is that we look at such indestructible things as Don Quixote and such vulnerable entities as humans, animals, or trees as being on the same footing. This obfuscates the ethical question of encountering a certain kind of object, namely living creatures, whose very being depends on the actions of other entities.93

Harman’s pathos in his fight against anthropocentrism is to speak about objects independently of our access to them – be it through theory or practice. But what exactly can be said about things in such a way that our claims would go beyond these two stances towards them, and how can such claims be grounded? This is a challenging question for Harman’s positive philosophical program, and there is a lot of criticism, particularly in Polish and Ukrainian scholarship, concerning OOO’s ability to deal with it. For instance, Rychter writes that a possible critique of Harman from the scientistic perspective would argue that his “anti-Kantian turn to speculative metaphysics does not at all eliminate the epistemological problems posed by Kant and

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the Enlightenment, but simply ignores them.”94 For scientism, Harman’s aim to deprive science of privileged access to knowledge means “equating knowledge with superstition, myth or pure fantasy.”95 We see a similar line of thought in critical notes by the Ukrainian scholar Victor Levytskyy, who argues that Harman’s attempt to fight anthropocentrism with an anthropomorphizing discourse ascribes to the world unverifiable features that make it almost indistinguishable from fantasy.96 Levytskyy comes to the conclusion that Harman’s OOO, in trying to understand the world from the perspective of the inanimate object, looks more like a rhetorical exercise, and Harman’s failed revolt against Kant is better identified as a “radical relativistic and solipsistic constructivism” in which “every object builds up its own world.”97 In the other Ukrainian article, by Pavlo Kretov and Olena Kretova, this problem of merging ontology and fantasy/rhetoric in Harman’s texts appears as a question about narratives. The authors show parallelism between objects as elements of narrative and objects as elements of a human-independent reality. This means that when we speak, the switch from the first meaning of objects to the second one is a mere change of language game, a shift in the focal point of the discourse.99, 100

95 Rychter, 228. One may also question, Rychter continues, Harman’s allegation of reductionism to scientific cognition and ask: “Is the complex, multidimensional picture of the world constructed by modern science really a greater simplification than Harman’s totalizing concept that assigns to all objects the same, quadruple ontological structure?” Rychter, 228. For a radical rationalistic critique of Harman, see Zachariasz, “New Age w Filozofii,” 343.
96 For instance, in The Quadruple Object, Harman uses (but not in a literal sense) such words as sincerity or allure when describing object-object interactions. Compare with Marzec who places Harman alongside Jane Bennett in the context of strategic anthropomorphism which aims at highlighting nonhuman agency to oppose anthropocentrism; see Marzec, “Kino Zorientowane Ku Przedmiotom,” 92.
97 Levytskyy, “Realizm vs konstruktyvizm,” 33. Compare also with Mieczkowska’s point: “I cannot agree to the hypothetical model of the quadruple object, or rather accept it and include it in my considerations, because it remains in the realm of speculation that cannot be verified or proven. And although Harman points to a metaphorical approach to his own considerations, the theory of the quadruple object itself seems to assume the features of a dangerously concrete (firm) content.” Mieczkowska, “Object-Oriented Ontology,” section 5.
98 Levytskyy, “Realizm vs konstruktyvizm,” 35.
100 Among other theoretical flaws that Harman is accused of are the circularity of his argument about the objects’ central place in ontology (Zachariasz, “New Age w Filozofii,” 337), his lack of conceptual clarity (Holy-Łuczaj, “Przedmiot Poczwórnny,” 232), his arbitrary interpretations of other philosophers (Holy-Łuczaj, “Przedmiot Poczwórnny,” 232–3), and his failure to provide sufficient grounds for the agency of objects (Mieczkowska, “Object-Oriented Ontology”).
Applying Harman’s ideas

We have established that it is Harman’s antianthropocentric stance that receives the most attention among the Polish and Ukrainian works engaged with his thought and sketched how these works consider this stance in a broader context. We can now recall Wajzer’s somewhat contradictory expression “non-anthropocentric humanities”, mentioned earlier, and together with Rafal Ilnicki pose the following question: What is left of the humanities if humans cease to be at their center? Having noted the problematic character of such humanities, Ilnicki concludes that this field may benefit from the very encounter, or even confrontation, with Harman’s view. Even if this view is not accepted completely, even if it is rejected or criticized, “it is certainly a well-thought-out perspective that allows, or even forces one, to take a position concerning objects.” According to Ilnicki, this would help to fill the research gap concerning the ontological status of objects (in the common meaning) that exists in contemporary humanities. Let us now look at the different ways in which Harman’s thought is being applied.

In general, Harman’s OOO is used in accordance with two motifs described previously – opposition to anthropocentrism and opposition to reductionism concerning concrete entities. This means that, when applied, it moves a researcher’s attention toward the nonhumans which are directly present in the physical world or which inhabit the fictional and virtual spaces created by us. Moreover, it invites approaching them not as correlates of our mind, epiphenomena of their constituents, or sums of their actions, but as autonomous beings that possess some ungraspable excess. This in turn can also ontologically justify nonliteral discourses as they can better succeed at speaking about the ungraspable in its ungraspability. One might as well concentrate her attention on texts and theories as the nonhuman objects, and then, Harman’s OOO can become an ontological framework for the event of interpretation. Let us now explicate these general remarks by considering several cases where Harman’s ideas are applied.

One of the ways to use Harman’s conception consists of treating the content or the form of an artwork as an expression of ideas that are similar to those of Harman. From this perspective, what Harman does by discursive theoretical means, a work of art conveyed by narrative, metaphors, visuals, and other artistic tools. What Harman tells us, an artwork shows. We can find an example of this approach in Dominika Meyer’s article that uses OOO lens to interpret the Quay Brothers’ short animation movie Street of Crocodiles, based on the story of the same name by the Polish author Bruno Schulz. Analyzing the change of frames (the structural layer of the animation) and the narrative, Meyer says that the directors “equate the living and the inanimate and, like Harman, break the shackles of anthropocentric thought.”

101 Ilnicki, review of Traktat o Przedmiotach.
102 Ilnicki, 2-nd paragraph.
103 Meyer, “Do Każdego Gestu Inny Aktor,” 117. Harman himself seems to do the same when analyzing literature, particularly the fiction of Howard Phillips Lovecraft; see
A similar approach is present in Andrzej Marzec’s article analyzing the films of Quentin Dupieux and Peter Strickland. For instance, Marzec writes that Dupieux’s Deerskin can be viewed as “a metaphor that each of us is wearing a coating in which we hide and conceal ourselves from the outside world”, and this is “a key Deerskin moment explaining in a simple way one of the fundamental assumptions of Harman’s philosophy: every real object without exception takes on a sensual form, precisely in order to be able to withdraw and hide from others in the inaccessible ontological depths.” Here, an artwork is seen as a metaphor, an artistic expression of some idea, that is, of something other than what is happening on the screen.

However, this paper also includes a completely opposite strategy, which can be called non-interpretation. Marzec calls Dupieux a precursor of a “turn towards things” in European cinematography since Dupieux was one of the few directors “who decided to make objects the main characters of their films.” The deerskin jacket in the mentioned film becomes an example of such a nonhuman main character. This piece of clothing, Marzec writes, “does not play the role of a trace of a murdered man, nor does it function as a metaphor, but becomes an autonomous thing that can be killed and destroyed, but cannot be reduced to anything else”; the director is thus suggesting here “that there is no ontological difference between people and other objects.” A nonhuman character thus acquires the same ability as human ones – it can cease to be flat and functional and attain depth. In that case, it cannot be reduced to a symptom/symbol/expression of something else.

What can we say then about the meaning of nonhuman actions in the space of the cinematic narrative? In one of the article’s subchapters with the telling title “Czego chcą przedmioty?” (What do objects want?), Marzec notes that the deerskin jacket “is presented not only as an object of human desire but also has its own, nonhuman desires, which it reveals in one of the conversations with its beloved man.” It “turns out to be an extremely possessive object” that “wants to prove its uniqueness”, which is why it wants to get rid of competition, namely, other jackets. Here, an attempt to

Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2012). Some features of this approach can be seen in the article of Ukrainian researcher Iryna Yakovenko (Yakovenko, “Reprezentatsiia rechovoho svitu”), but Harman’s theory or, more broadly, OOO does not seem to affect her interpretation much and is present there rather as an ornament.


Marzec, “Kino Zorientowane Ku Przedmiotom,” 86.
106 Ibid., 82.
107 Ibid., 82–3.
108 This can happen due to different cinematographic techniques used by a director. Marzec names several techniques used by Dupieux: “the unconventional points of [camera] view, shots from around the corner, from behind the bed or from the backseat of a car, which can be associated with the gaze of objects.” Ibid., 85.
109 Ibid., 84.
110 Ibid., 84.
break out of the anthropocentric cage seems to lead to the radical simplification of the interpretation process. Instead of a detailed analysis of what function the object’s agency in a film (created by a human!) has, instead of an analysis of its role as a certain symbol or metaphor, we can simply say: the object wants, the object does. Thus, our discourse becomes in a sense noninterpretative. We are moving against interpretation as such, in a sense reminiscent of Susan Sontag’s and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s approaches, namely, interpretation as trying to find a “deeper meaning” beyond what is revealed. We are staying on the surface.

Eventually, we can find two divergent strategies in Marzec’s text. On one level, he rejects interpretation in the form of considering something as something else – we see on the screen that the jacket wants something, and this means exactly this, nothing else. On the other level though, he interprets the events in the film as metaphorical/artistic expression and/or illustration of Harman’s philosophical ideas. In a sense, this is not a contradiction. In order to consider the actions of nonhuman characters as irreducible to some “too human” symbolism, we already need to accept Harman’s claim about the autonomy of objects (particularly fictional). Then, naturally, all that happens on the screen becomes an expression of Harman’s ideas.

Another Polish author Paweł Graf suggests a more cautious way of applying Harman’s ideas. Discussing the difficulty of conceptually grasping the phenomenon of epiphany, Graf provides a quote from the text by the already mentioned Polish writer Bruno Schulz claiming that through this literary text “we gain such insight into the epiphany that no definition of it can give us.” Even though, he continues, “its strong imagery obscures and renders invisible other aspects of this category, so its view is incomplete. Incompleteness, after all, is a constant feature of our cognition, it is in this fragmentary way that reality discloses itself to us.” Graf then refers to Harman’s idea that objects are both attached and not attached to their qualities (they are always something more than their qualities) as providing an ontological ground for the mentioned fragmentary way in which reality reveals itself. This seems to suggest more possibilities for broader applications that would no longer need an artwork to resemble in some way Harman’s ideas. It is a more open approach that has the potential of giving

111 A similar hermeneutic circle is acknowledged by another Polish researcher Małgorzata Kowalcze, who uses Harman’s OOO to discuss William Golding’s novel Free Fall. She writes that her “article has – on the one hand – the features of a literary interpretation supported by philosophical theory, and – on the other hand – an illustrative example of the latter.” Małgorzata Kowalcze, “Williama Goldinga Siłą Bezwładu w Perspektywie Ontologii Zorientowanej Na Przedmiot,” Przestrzenie Teorii 35 (December 15, 2021): 105, https://doi.org/10.14746/pt.2021.35.4. Kowalcze’s approach, though, seems more persuasive, since she examines the nonhuman agency not as it is, but as it constitutes a part of the experience of the main (post)human character.


113 Ibid., 101.
more voice to artworks and securing the autonomy of art – its capability to reveal truth becomes philosophically justified. This kind of application would be compatible with Harman’s lasting admiration of non-literal ways of speaking. For instance, metaphor, according to Harman, is a paradigmatic non-reductive way of treating objects because metaphor cannot be transformed into prose terms without losses. However, Graf mentions Harman only briefly and does not elaborate on concrete ways of applying OOO as this kind of framework.

Not only can Harman’s OOO play the role of defending – by grounding – less precise discourses against scientism and, in general, against striving for the ultimate truth in prose terms; it is also an example of such almost literary discourse. In his article, Polish researcher Tymon Adamczewski depicts OOO as an alternative to strictly scientific discourse in the domain of ecocriticism. Adamczewski is mostly concentrated on the works of Timothy Morton, another representative of OOO, whose particular interest is ecology. According to Adamczewski, “ecocriticism has moved from a marginalized discourse associated with militant practices or evoking a tone of apocalyptic disaster to one which recognizes nonhuman perspectives by acknowledging the importance of animals, the environment, and material practices.” In this context, “the realist positions of object-oriented ontology, aided by a phenomenological probing of experience but with a reversal of the customary human-centered point of view, seem to offer a more intricate way of conceptualizing the weakened human subject involved in a correspondingly weak intellectual practice.” This “weakness” of the intellectual practice can be found in Harman’s and Morton’s works as well since they are not relying on science as an exclusive “legitimizing discourse.” In addition to the scientific language of data about physical objects, traditional in ecological discourses, these authors, Adamczewski notes, actively use a variety of semi-literary phrasing and imagery, moving in line with Harman’s position that philosophy “has a much closer relationship with aesthetics than with mathematics or natural sciences.” Thus, Adamczewski’s article shows how OOO grounds and is itself an alternative to “strong” intellectual practices which position themselves as providing strictly formulated truths. Such an alternative is aware of the finitude and weakness of

114 See Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 66–81.
117 Ibid., 143.
118 Ibid., 143.
119 Ibid., 140. He cites here Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 9.
cognition and concludes that sometimes reality can be only alluded to, not captured exhaustively, which justifies, for instance, metaphorical ways of speaking about it.\footnote{120}

While the above-discussed ways of applying Harman's ideas to grounding certain discourses focus on the incompleteness and weakness that are “redeemed” by Harman’s ontology, there is another aspect of OOO in a broader sense that can be used for this purpose. Similarly, to Graf, Samuel Nowak employs OOO as an ontological framework. Discussing how the ideas of Maria Janion, a Polish scholar, literary theorist, and feminist, could be reinforced with OOO’s insights, Nowak views his own engagement with her works in terms of Bryant’s machinic ontology:

> Inspired by speculative realism, we can treat Janion’s work as a complex object which, depending on the circumstances, sets in motion different machine-theories (other objects), and these generate new theories. If we agree with Levi R. Bryant that each machine has its own independent powers ... revealing only locally and to a limited extent, then the theories also provoke various reactions, appropriate only to contingent circumstances. They never exhaust their potential. Each subsequent reading may result in the awakening of so far undisclosed and always withdrawn intellectual powers.\footnote{121}

Thus, Nowak’s attempt to combine Janion’s work with the ideas from OOO gains an ontological justification in OOO itself.

Already in the citation above, we see two aspects of Nowak’s approach. On the one hand, he aims to justify unusual interpretations. He even directly says that “it is worth referring to the materialistic works of Janion, even at the cost of turning some of the intuitions formulated there against the author herself.”\footnote{122} On the other hand, Nowak wants to keep the interpretations of this kind somehow intrinsic to the interpreted theory. For this, he uses Bryant’s discourse about “withdrawn intellectual powers” that remain undisclosed until the event of interpretation. This aims to distinguish Nowak’s strategy from other untraditional ways of interpreting things. He mentions poststructuralists, particularly the “perverse” use of Carl Schmitt’s theory by Chantal Mouffe, and claims that “it was only the object-oriented philosophy that made it possible to understand the conditions of possibility and success of this operation, locating power in the object itself (theory here), and not in its use (reading).”\footnote{123}

\footnote{120} Compare with Filip Ryba’s paper on the metaphorization of contemporary theoretical discourses, where Harman is one of the discussed theoreticians; see Filip Ryba, “Węzeł i Supeł: Od Metaforyzacji Do Materioforyzacji Dyskursów Teoretycznych,” Pamiętnik Teatralny 71.4 (December 17, 2022), https://doi.org/10.36744/pt.1282.

\footnote{121} Nowak, “Przebudzenie Mocy,” 219–20.

\footnote{122} Ibid., 218.

\footnote{123} Ibid., 220.
However, the key question is whether this ontologizing of unconventional interpretations has a function apart from a rhetorical one. Is it possible to disqualify any interpretation at all based on its inconsistency with the interpreted work if we defend the existence of always hidden intellectual powers of this work? It seems that if we accept this framework, any critique of some unusual interpretation is unable to refer to the “original” meaning of the interpreted work because it will always have some hidden dimension. Consequently, both the critique and the defense of the interpretation turn out to take place solely on the side of the interpreter, the reader. It is only when an interpretation is successful, that is when it is recognized and accepted by a significant portion of readers (preferably experts), that one can try to retroactively ascribe this new reading to the interpreted work and suggest that it was contained there in the withdrawn mode from the very beginning.

Given these complications, we might go further and reject the discourse of hidden meaning that is revealed at some point. In the discussed text, Nowak seems to merge the meanings of speculative realism and OOO. Moreover, it may be subject to doubt whether Bryant’s recent turn to machinic ontology can still be regarded as a part of OOO. Nevertheless, when we look into OOO to find an ontological framework for an event of interpretation, the alternative to Nowak’s usage of Bryant’s ideas might be Harman’s ontology itself. We can look at Nowak’s claims expressed in the article as the result of the encounter between three objects – Harman’s version of OOO, Janion’s theory, and Nowak himself. This encounter creates a new object – text-interpretation. This may help to justify – at least in some regard – even the questionable aspects of an interpretation, particularly Nowak’s. The weak point of this ontological justification for an – often unusual – interpretation is the lack of methodological instruments and procedures derived from OOO. Any interpretation – however arbitrary – would be completely compatible with this ontological framework. That’s why the identification and formulation of concrete interpretative tools and rules would be a productive development in the sphere of applying Harman’s ideas.

Conclusion

To sum up, Graham Harman’s philosophy attracted much interest among Polish and – to a lesser extent – Ukrainian researchers. In Poland, two of Harman’s books and two articles have been translated, and at least two books, one PhD dissertation, and around two dozen articles discuss or apply his ideas. Apart from philosophy, his OOO

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124 See, for example, a questionable analogy between the idea of self-alienation of Slavic culture and the withdrawn objects of OOO (Ibid., 224–5).
126 Klugowski, “Kreowanie Wizji Świata.”
is used for discussing literature,\textsuperscript{127} video games,\textsuperscript{128} films,\textsuperscript{129} humanities in general,\textsuperscript{130} education,\textsuperscript{131} management processes,\textsuperscript{132} antique studies,\textsuperscript{133} and ecocriticism.\textsuperscript{134} In Ukraine, one of Harman's articles has been translated, and around ten articles and one collective monography engage with his philosophical project. Some of the Ukrainian works also apply Harman's OOO in contexts that are not strictly philosophical, namely, in literary criticism,\textsuperscript{135} urban studies,\textsuperscript{136} film studies,\textsuperscript{137} and humanities in general.\textsuperscript{138}

There are several tendencies characteristic of this reception. The first is a conflation of Harman's object-oriented ontology and speculative realism. The latter is a broader concept but is often mistakenly described by the features specific to OOO, particularly by the view that objects are fundamental building blocks of reality. The second consists of the prevalence of the two interconnected motifs in the works that engage with Harman's ideas: antianthropocentrism and antireductionism. They reflect Harman's attempt to focus on nonhumans in his philosophical considerations and defend their ontological autonomy as well as their inaccessible dimension. He opposes reducing objects in general to their constituents or effects while seeking to speak about them as they are \textit{in themselves}. When applied, Harman's theory often becomes the lens for interpretation and directs our attention to nonhumans and the hidden, inexplicable dimension of things or provides an ontological grounding for semi-literary and literary discourses. The methodology of its application, though, needs further development and clarification.


\textsuperscript{129} Marzec, “Kino Zorientowane Ku Przedmiotom”; Meyer, “Do Każdego Gestu Inny Aktor.”

\textsuperscript{130} Czemiel, “The Secret Life of Things”; Nowak, “Przebudzenie Mocy.”

\textsuperscript{131} Dembiński, “Edukacja Jako Przedmiot Realistycznie.”


\textsuperscript{133} Mikołajczak, “Ad Rem.”

\textsuperscript{134} Adamczewski, “Weakness, Lameness and Veering. On the Practical Dimensions of Theories of Ecocriticism.”

\textsuperscript{135} Yakovenko, “Reprezentatsiia rechovoho svitu.”

\textsuperscript{136} Sholukho, “Kulturolohichna reteptsiia.”

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