The Perception of Germany in the Kyivan Press: From Ukrainian People's Republic to the Hetmanate (November 1917 — December 1918)

Author(s): Ivan Basenko


Published by: National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

http://kmhj.ukma.edu.ua/
The Perception of Germany in the Kyivan Press: 
From Ukrainian People's Republic to the Hetmanate 
(November 1917 — December 1918)

Ivan Basenko
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 
Department of History

Abstract
The 1917 February Revolution led to the reshaping of the war-era image of the German enemy. Focusing on the former imperial borderland province of the Southwestern Krai, this article unveils the national, political, and cultural considerations of the local Ukrainian and Russian-language media that affected their attitude towards the Germans. It argues that the developments of the 1917–1918 Ukrainian Revolution presented a unique case of constructing the image of the Germans due to the ongoing rivalry between the respective Ukrainian and Russian national projects. The study is based on the materials of prominent Kyivan daily newspapers, thus rendering the spectrum of the region's political thought. Built upon the concept of imagology, the article apprehends the images of “otherness” in conjunction with the actor's own identity.

Key Words: image of the Germans, Kyivan press, Ukrainian Revolution, nationalism, First World War.

Introduction
Throughout the First World War, the image of the ultimate German threat had served as a key instrument of the Russian Empire's mass mobilization and war effort. However, by the time the 1917 February Revolution broke out, this propaganda construct had already been overshadowed by general war weariness. The downfall of the Romanov dynasty brought to an end the country's rigid “war till victory” policy and thus shattered the uniform image of the enemy. Instead, various political actors acceding to power across the former empire had adopted their distinct attitudes towards belligerent Germany.

---

Ukrainian movement had succeeded in the establishment of a de facto independent national state by November 20, 1917. The administrative, economic, and cultural center of the Southwestern Krai was the city of Kyiv. In 1917 Kyiv became the locus of the region’s revolutionary activity, contested between the Ukrainian and the Russian national projects. As contrasted to the numerically superior Ukrainian population of the Krai, the Russians constituted the majority of Kyiv’s dwellers. Traditionally, they considered the Ukrainians to be “Little Russians” — an inherent part of the single all-Russian nation. By covering both the Ukrainian and the Russian-language press this study illustrates how different national identities influenced the controversial perception of the Germans during the time of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and the Hetmanate. While modern historiography on the subject is limited to the comprehensive, yet Russia-centered investigations of Boris Kolonizkij and Tatiana Filippova, this research provides a distinct Ukrainian perspective. Alongside with other national movements on the periphery of the disintegrating Empire, the Ukrainian Revolution presents a unique background for constructing the image of the Germans.

The study is based on the materials of Kyiv’s prominent daily newspapers that formed the entire spectrum of the city’s political thought: the Ukrainian social liberal Nova Rada and the press organ of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party — Robitnycha Hazeta, the Russian rightist Kievliaanin and Golos Kieva, progressive (socialist and liberal) Kievskaia Mysl, Poslednie

3 The paper employs the Gregorian calendar. However, the text preserves the original Julian calendar in the footnotes to those articles that were published prior to the calendar reform of March 1918. On the history of the Ukrainian Revolution, see: Valerii Smolii et al., Narresy istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii 1917–1921 roki (Essays on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution (1917–1921)), vol.1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2011).

4 In 1917 the Ukrainians amounted to 75.5% of the Southwestern Krai’s population while the Russians — only to 3.4%. According to the statistics of Isaac Bisk, in 1917 Kyiv reached the level of approximately 470,000 dwellers. Among them, the largest share of 49.9% belonged to the ethnic Russians while the Ukrainians held only 12%, another 4.4% identified themselves as Little Russians (Malorossy in Russian); other nationalities held around 34% of the city’s population. Russians retained key positions in the economy, culture, and administration while Ukrainians occupied the lowest social ranks. See: Tamara Lazanska, “Narodonaselennia Ukrainy [The Population of Ukraine],” in Ukrainske pytannia v Rossii imperii (kinets XIX — pochatok XX st.), ed. V. H. Sarbei (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1999), 78–111.


Novosti, and Yuzhnaia Gazeta. Since these newspapers had been politically committed to the July 1917 Kyiv City Council elections, it is possible to deduce their potential audience from the result of that ballot. Out of the 307,000 individuals eligible in the general secret ballot, 174,000 participated in the elections. The Socialist Bloc (formed by the Russian leftists and supported by Kievskaiia Mysl) gained 37% and the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (Poslednie Novosti, Yuzhnaia Gazeta) additionally received 9%, the Ukrainian socialist parties gained 21%, the Non-Partisan Alliance of Russian voters (supported by Kievlianin) gained 15% and the Bolsheviks — 6% of the approval rate. As follows from the above data, the city itself remained a stronghold of Russian influence. As to the Ukrainian press, according to Oleksandr Mukomela its popularity rested upon the Ukrainian majority of the Krai.

The study proceeds from Benedict Anderson’s concept of a nation as an “imagined political community” and is built on the notion of imagology. Anderson emphasizes the principal role of a printed vernacular in the creation of a broad imagined community of native speakers. In particular, he credits the press for the dissemination of national ideas in 19th century Europe. Similarly to the Anderson’s concept, imagology apprehends a written text as an instrument of national image construction. Dealing with the textual analysis of national representations, imagology addresses cross-national relations and seeks to uncover the image of the “other” in


11 “Obshchie itogi.”


conjunction with the actor’s “self-image.” This survey explores a set of opinions about Germany and the Germans, found in leading articles of the Kyivan press.  

The Perception of Germany in Times of the UNR and the Hetmanate

The 1917 October Uprising in Petrograd marked the end of the Russian Provisional Government’s “revolutionary defense” policy, thus paving the way for the Bolsheviks’ concept of an immediate truce with the Central Powers. Yet, neither the majority of the Russian political parties nor the Ukrainian Central Rada had recognized the legitimacy of the new Bolshevik order. Therefore, acting as a legal regional authority, the Central Rada had established a separate Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR). These developments led to the final destruction of the former all-Russian informational space and introduced the Ukrainian-language press of Kyiv as a new mouthpiece of the state. Denouncing the Bolsheviks, both Nova Rada and Robitnycha Hazeta were anxious about their intention to conclude a peace treaty on behalf of entire Russia. In order to counteract this, Robitnycha Hazeta urged to adopt:

A definite, clear, independent tactic in the peace negotiations... in order to save Ukraine from the harsh consequences of the Council of the People's Commissars’ activity, from the harsh intentions of Germany to conquer Ukraine together with the no less odious plans of the Allies.

---


16 Since the 1917 abolition of the monarchy the idea of “revolutionary defense” was adopted as an ideological substitute for outdated imperial war doctrine. While pursuing the same “war till victory” objective, the Russian Provisional Government officially propagated the defense of revolutionary Russian democracy against the despotic regime of imperialistic Germany. See: Kolonizkij, “Metamorphosen der Germanophobie,” 121–27.

17 In March 1917 the Ukrainian Central Rada was organized in Kyiv as the all-Ukrainian center, uniting political, cultural, and professional organizations. Following the decision of the All-Ukrainian National Congress, on April 21, 1917 the Central Rada became the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine. On July 16, 1917 the Russian Provisional Government recognized the Central Rada as Ukraine’s highest regional authority. See: Vladyslav Verstiuk, “Liutneva revoliutsiia, Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada, Brest [The February Revolution, the Ukrainian Central Rada, Brest],” in Narysy istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii 1917–1921 rokov, ed. by Valerii Smoliī et al., vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2011), 87–250.


As “Germany itself had been exhausted to the end,” Nova Rada anticipated its reciprocity.\(^{20}\) The outbreak of Soviet Russia’s aggression against the UNR in December of 1917 had only strengthened the anti-Bolshevik sentiments of the Ukrainian press. Nova Rada condemned the Bolsheviks’ military invasion as an act of hypocrisy, rhetorically asking the Russian “brothers and comrades”: “Do you perceive us, the democracy of Ukraine, as a more terrifying enemy than the hordes of General Hindenburg [German Field Marshal] themselves?”\(^{21}\) Indignant about the Russian Bolsheviks’ war crimes in Ukraine, Nova Rada drew a parallel between these and the past atrocities of the German and Tsarist armies.\(^{22}\)

The Russian-language press of Kyiv shared the Ukrainian media’s strong dislike for the Bolshevik regime. Yet, the Russian newspapers generally neglected the Ukrainian UNR-centered stance and perceived the October Uprising from the all-Russian perspective. They claimed that the final defeat of Russia was the result of a German-Bolshevik conspiracy.\(^{23}\) Routinely depicting the underhanded German plotting, newspapers presented the Bolsheviks as the principal traitors, “puppets in the hands of the Germans.”\(^{24}\) Lev Voitolovskii was one of many commentators:

\[
\text{Here, in Russia, they are tearing off the epaullets from the officers, with whom they were once shedding blood for the integrity of the Russian borders; yet, in the occupied territories... where the sibilant whip is firmly squeezed in the hand of the German officer, they are silent and humble, bending their backs in front of the Prussian masters.}\(^{25}\)
\]

Meanwhile, Kievlianin acknowledged Germany’s victory over the Slavs as the product of the enemy’s higher level of patriotic consciousness and the nation’s unity.\(^{26}\) Kievlianin’s Editor-in-chief Vasilii Shulgin blamed apathetic Russian society and its “irresponsible” revolutionary leaders: “The self-sacrificing German patriots will be the rulers over the Russians, who had

---
\(^{20}\) “Ahonia [Agony],” Nova Rada, January 16, 1918, 1.
\(^{21}\) “Vidovza vseukrainskoho zizdu rad deputativ [The Proclamation of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Board Deputies],” Nova Rada, December 9, 1917, 1.
\(^{24}\) “Dekret o mire [The Decree on Peace],” Poslednie Novosti, November 10, 1917, 1; “Germanskii priaz o bratani [The German Order About Fraternization],” Kievskaia Mysl, November 17, 1917, 3; A. N. Aleksandrovskii, “Nemets i slavianin [The German and the Slav],” Yuzhnaia Gazeta, November 5, 1917, 2; “Peremirie zakliuchenio — obiavlena novaia voina [Truce is Concluded — New War is Proclaimed],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 5, 1917, 1.
\(^{25}\) L. Voitolovskii, “Russkie kommunyner pered litsom prusskikh generalov [The Russian Communards in Face of the Prussian Generals],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 15, 1917, 2.
disavowed their Motherland.”

The newspaper portrayed average Russian citizens, who were completely indifferent about the threat of “German enslavement,” contemptuously. These citizens typically responded that they “used to live under Nicholas [of Russia],” and so, “would live under [German Emperor] Wilhelm as well.”

The allegedly German instigated Ukrainian question was another concern of the Russian-language press. Kievskaia Mysl dreaded enemy annexation of Russia’s “Western Provinces” under the pretext of their national liberation. As Vasilii Rozanov argued, German imperialism aimed “to extrude Russia into Asia ... to deprive her of European culture and political weight in the region.”

Commenting on the separate peace negotiations, Konstantin Sukhovykh (Narodin) encouraged the Ukrainian Government to abstain from collaboration with the Germans. In turn, Shulgin forewarned the Ukrainians about the cunning German policy of divide et impera:

The Germans are fully aware that despite all their diabolic fraud over the foundation of “Independent” Ukraine, the close link between the latter and Russia, i.e. between the South-Russian and North-Russian states could be revived.

For Shulgin the “fratricidal” Soviet–Ukrainian war was actually German intrigue, directed at Russia’s dissolution. Kievlianin resisted the Ukrainian pro-German orientation by condemning the recurrence of “Mazepa’s treason,” intimidating Ukrainians with disastrous economic aftermaths and inevitable Allied retaliation.


29 “Gore pobezdennym [Devil Take the Hindmost!],” Kievskaia Mysl, December 22, 1917, 1.


33 Shulgin, “Respublika s tsarem,” 1; V. Shulgin, “Tak bylo, no tak da ne budet [It Has Been so but Will Never be Again],” Kievlianin, December 8, 1917, 1–2.

34 “Mazepa’s treason” derives from the name of Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709), who had opposed his Russian patron, tsar Peter the Great, and took the Swedish side in the Great Northern War, 1700–1721. The Russian nationalists commonly utilized the “mazepynstvo” defamatory cliché to mark the Ukrainian national movement as treacherous towards Russia. See: V. B. Liubchenko, Entsiklopediia istorii Ukrainy [Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], vol. 6, s.v. “Mazepynstvo,” (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2009), 426–27. Source: Shulgin, “Tak bylo, no tak da ne budet,” 1–2; “Rech,
One cannot expect good from the Ukrainians, with marks stuck to their hands... In the event of a German victory they together with the rest of the Slavs will languish miserably as slaves, but unlike the rest — with the brand of Cain on the brow.35

For the sake of salvation he urged Ukraine to become "the second righteous among nations" along with "Lot" — the Russian White movement's leader General Kaledin.36 However, on the eve of the Ukrainian — Central Powers' peace agreement Kievljanin acknowledged its failure. Shulgin depicted Ukrainians as "beloved German apprentices," who were eager to find themselves under the patronage of "the Berlin Eagle."37 Despite this intermediate defeat, Kievljanin was confident in the final triumph of the anti-German coalition and the subsequent restoration of allied Russia.38

When on February 9, 1918 Ukraine signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, it was recognized as an independent nation and received military assistance in the war against the Bolsheviks. By concluding the treaty Germany sought to resolve its pressing food shortages at the expense of the Ukrainian surplus and, what is important, to undermine Russian hegemony in the region.39 Although the German interference had far-reaching consequences, in the spring of 1918 the allied Deutsches Heer played a crucial role in the repulsion of the Russian Bolsheviks and the renewal of the Ukrainian state.40 This foreign military support had drastically reshaped the attitude of the Kyivan press towards the Germans, marking a new era of mutual cooperation. The friendly image was reinforced by the German communiqués, typically pledging to assist Ukraine: “Our troops were summoned to help Ukraine in her up-hill struggle against the Great Russians...”41 Ukrainian officials induced the population “to meet the German army easily and trustingly, to join it in the defense of one’s own country against the Katsap furious skazannaia V. V. Shulginym 20-go dekabria v sobranii russkih izbiratelei [The Speech of V. V. Shulgin, Proclaimed on December 20 at the Meeting of Russian Voters],” Kievljanin, December 22, 1917, 1; V. Shulgin, “Lebedinaia pesn [The Swan Song],” Kievljanin, December 17, 1917, 1.

35 “Rech, skazannaia V. V. Shulginym,” 1.
36 “Rech, skazannaia V. V. Shulginym,” 1.
41 “Hermanske povidomlennia vid 19-ho liutoho [The German Communiqué of February 19],” Nova Rada, February 24, 1918, 3; “Hermanskyi kantsler ukrainskomu pravytelstvu [The German Chancellor’s Statement, Directed to the Ukrainian Government],” Nova Rada, March 13, 1918, 2.
and corrupt gangs!" Since the recapture of Kyiv in March 1918 the Germans were praised as "allies" and "liberators," "clearing Ukraine" from the Russian-Bolshevik invaders. This pro-German orientation consolidated even further upon the information of the Entente's support for an indivisible Russia.

In spite of the above mentioned positive changes, the image of the Germans remained ambiguous across the region and amongst different groups. Newspapers reported on the pro-Russian and pro-Bolshevik resistance in the South East of Ukraine. Nova Rada apprehended this as inertia of thinking — a result of deeply rooted imperial Germanophobia:

Citizens should finally subdue their war-built views and discern the German army the way it actually is — as a helper in the fight against the common enemy — the enemy, whom we could not overcome on our own.

The Ukrainian countryside was initially anxious about "reactionery" German rule and the food requisitions. At the same time peasants were pleasantly astonished with the fact of "German-Ukrainian" cooperation. Well-to-do farmers soon credited the Germans with the

---

42 Katsap — a common Ukrainian pejorative term for the Great Russians (Russians). Plausibly, the term was coined from the “Kak Tsap” word combination, meaning “Like a Goat” and referring to the mocking Ukrainian stereotype of an average bearded Russian. However, member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Dmytro Yavornytskyi demonstrated the Turkic origin of the term. In fact, “Katsap” derived from the Turkic notion of “Kasap” i.e. “Butcher,” “Knacker.” See: Yevhen Nakonechnyi, Ukradene imia: Chomu rusyny staly ukraintsiamy [The Stolen Name: Why the Ruthenians Became the Ukrainians], (Lviv: Piramida, 2004), 327–37. Source: “Proklamatsiia myrnoi ukrainskoi delehatsii [The Proclamation of the Ukrainian Peace Delegation],” Nova Rada, February 28, 1918, 1; “Rozmova z ministrom dorih [Interview with the Minister of Transport],” Nova Rada, March 13, 1918, 2.

43 “Rozhrom bilshovykiv pid Birzuloiu [The Defeat of the Bolsheviks near Birzula],” Nova Rada, March 9, 1918, 3; “Vyzvolennia Kharkova [The Liberation of Kharkiv],” Nova Rada, April 12, 1918, 2; “Za dvoma zaitsiamy [Two Birds in the Bush],” Nova Rada, April 5, 1918, 2.

44 “Frantsuzka presa pro myr z Ukrainoiu [The French Press About the Peace with Ukraine],” Nova Rada, March 14, 1918, 1; “Soiuznyky Rosii [Russia’s Allies],” Nova Rada, April 13, 1918, 1; “Soiuznyky Rosii ta Ukrainy [The Allies of Russia and Ukraine],” Nova Rada, April 12, 1918, 1.

45 “V Nikolaev [In Mykolaiv],” Kievskaia Mysl, March 26, 1918, 3; “Voina s bolshevikami [The War against the Bolsheviks],” Kievskaia Mysl, April 16, 1918, 2.

46 “Delikatna sprava [A Delicate Matter],” Nova Rada, April 9, 1918, 1.


establishment of a safe, “strict but just” order. Yet, the poor and anarchists remained ill-disposed and favored the Bolshevik style plunder of the “bourgeoisie.”⁴⁹ Notably, Nova Rada supported the German police operations against such criminal gangs.⁵⁰ The leader of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists and the former vice-president of the Central Rada, Serhii Yefremov, apprehended the German stay as a forced upon yet potentially beneficial model. He hoped that the Ukrainians would eventually adopt the German virtues of order and diligence.⁵¹ According to Yefremov, by the summer of 1918 the Germans had managed to win the hearts of the Ukrainian peasantry:

A German POW had appeared here for the first time in the spring of 1916 … Mostly he behaved with dignity and left behind not only good fame but also a great deal of romances. [Then came] the real German — carrying a rifle and an iron helmet, serious, self-possessed, disciplined… At first there were incidents when in response to the German provision requests, concerning let us say, “eggs,” the peasants replied: “No Central Rada — no eggs.” Now this is in the past… The Germans are purchasing and paying on a regular basis… They are supplied willingly, without requisitions. … One can see power in a German. Initially it seemed to be hostile; “defending the bourgeoisie, they say,” yet it is increasingly appealing due to its inner correctness, self-control, discipline: this is just a well set operating mechanism… The Germans are stationed in the village for over a month — and not a single hen is missing, none of the window glass is broken, neither a drunken individual among them, nor bloody noses amongst the locals. Our lads are amazed…⁵²

Not all of the Ukrainian Central Rada’s statesmen shared Yefremov’s favorable attitude towards the Germans. As early as the end of March 1917 the Ukrainian Social Democrats acknowledged the threat of imperial Germany. Their party newspaper, Robitnycha Hazeta, was dissatisfied with plausible German economic domination and the infringement of the leftist movement in Ukraine.⁵³ Member of the Central Rada and former minister of education, Ivan Steshenko, rhymed this concern:

⁵⁰ “St. Rakitna [Rakitna Station],” Nova Rada, March 14, 1918, 4.
⁵² Yefremov, “Na ruinakh,” 2.
⁵³ “Pro spravu tovaroobminu z tsentralnymy derzhavami [About the Deal of Trade Barter with the Central Powers],” Robitnycha Hazeta, April 4, 1918, 2; L. Bukhanovskyi, “Ekonomichni narysy [Feature Stories on Economics],” Robitnycha Hazeta, March 29, 1918, 2; “Z Partiiinoho zhyttia. Zbori kyivskoi orhanizatsii USDR parti [From Party Life. The Assembly of Kyiv’s Organization of the Ukrainian SD Workers’ Party],” Robitnycha Hazeta, March 27, 1918, 1–2.
Do you believe, friends of order,
That cannons of Krupp and the bayonets fodder
Will build you a levee against all odds
Rising over live human thoughts? 54

It should be noted though, that *Robitnycha Hazeta*’s aversion towards “German imperialism” was actually limited to the “Prussian” ruling elite. On the contrary, the newspaper preserved a traditional sympathy for nation-wide “German democracy.” 55 Overall, the newspapers perceived the Ukrainian Government’s ineffectiveness as the primary cause of the German interference in the country’s internal affairs. The media feared that the non-implementation of the peace treaty provisions concerning the food supply would lead to German military occupation. 56

In the words of *Nova Rada*, the German army “would neither help nor befriend us on an empty stomach...” 57

The Russian-language press of Kyiv perceived the Germans from the standpoint of their primary goal — the restoration of a “one and indivisible Russia.” For *Kievlianin* the February 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Ukraine — Central Powers) symbolized the start of the foreign German occupation. Yet, Shulgin welcomed the Germans with a grim irony, as a just retribution for the outrages of the revolutionaries:

It came strong, steady, confident... Counter-revolution came personified by the German officers and soldiers, who occupied Russia. ... Counter-revolution is order, stable authority; it is the end to idleness, chatter, the end of the bullying and violence against the defenseless... The Germans

---


57 “Nebezpechna neiasnist [Dangerous Uncertainty],” *Nova Rada*, March 15, 1918, 1.
brought this order at the point of their bayonets... in the first place restoring railroads, they ordered to sweep and perfectly clean our miserable Kyiv train station — the emblem of contemporary culture... Cleanness and tidiness! Is there a source ever more hostile to the crowned with dirt Russian Revolution? 58

However, the loyal to the Entente Kievlianin refused to collaborate with the “honest German enemy” and announced its closure. 59 In April of 1918 its editorial staff organized another rightist newspaper, Golos Kieva. The Russian newspapers acknowledged the German army’s support for the Ukrainian state. 60 Still, they expressed gratitude to the Germans for their “courteous” treatment, and liberation from the Bolshevik terror. 61 Aware of Germany’s mercenary goals, the Russian press predicted the near end of the Ukrainian state project. 62

The subsequent changes in attitude towards the Germans occurred in late April of 1918, following the forcible dissolution of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Instigated by the German military command, the Hetman’s coup d’etat had led to the de facto German military occupation of Ukraine. 63 Consequently, this disrupted Ukraine’s “German orientation.” 64 Ex-member of the Central Rada and Nova Rada’s Editor-in-chief Andrii Nikovskyi wrote:

When the German army came to Ukraine to help in the war against the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian intellectuals and the conscious part of the people at first vaguely and then with a growing interest embraced the “German orientation” — the idea of the relations with Germany that could lead to

58 V. Shulgin, “Kiev, 24 fevralia (9-go marta) 1918 g. [Kyiv, February 24 (March 9), 1918],” Kievlianin, February 25, 1918, 1.
60 D. Zaluzhnyi, “V ekstaze samostiinosti [In the Ecstasy of Independence],” Golos Kieva, April 21, 1918, 2.
62 “V germanskom shtabe [In the German Headquarters],” Poslednie Novosti, April 26, 1918, 2; “Prikaz gen. Feldmarshala fon-Eikhgorna [The Order of General Field Marshal von Eichhorn],” Kievskaiia Mysl, April 27, 1918, 1.
63 Since the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada Germany has lost its official status of an allied power. Although it continued with the policy of formal Ukrainian State recognition, the German military administration de facto subdued the Hetman’s authority and established the occupational regime. See: Pyrih, “Nimetsko-avstriiska okupatsiia Ukrainy,” 19–30.
amity with this state. [... however] In the present circumstances in Ukraine the German orientation is almost entirely gone...65

The Ukrainian newspapers accused the “reactionary German elite” of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty’s violation and the usurpation of power under the mask of the Hetmanate.66 However, former Central Rada politicians refrained from military resistance and adopted the strategy of public protest.67 In the first place, the Ukrainian press acknowledged the government’s incompetence and the overall nation’s infantilism as the primary causes of the state’s failure. Yet, there were other reasons to tolerate the German occupation. First, the German army remained the only force capable of defending Ukraine from permanent Russian Bolshevik invasion.68 Second, the alternative to the German defeat had been reckoned as an even greater disaster due to the pro-Russian stance of the Entente Powers.69 As a result, the Ukrainian media supported the pro-Ukrainian German political opposition in the Reichstag.70 Notably, it was the German Social Democrats and the party of the Center — who favored the creation of a strong Ukrainian state as a “forefront of Western civilization” against the Russian peril.71 Simultaneously, the Ukrainian press attempted to discourage the German Government from its support of the former imperial Russian elites in Ukraine.72 It forewarned Berlin that the Hetmanate authority consisted of pro-Russian elements, secretly hostile towards both the German Empire and Ukraine.73 On the

68 “Bilshovyskiy desant [The Bolshevik Landing],” Robitnycha Hazeta, June 18, 1918, 2; “Nimtsi i bilshovyky [The Germans and the Bolsheviks],” Robitnycha Hazeta, June 26, 1918, 2.
69 “Peremoha na Zakhodi [The Victory in the West],” Nova Rada, June 5, 1918, 2.
71 “Ukrainska sprava v Nimechchyni i Avstrii [The Ukrainian Affairs in Germany and Austria],” Nova Rada, May 11, 1918, 1; “Vorwarts pro perevorot na Ukraini [Vorwarts About the Coup in Ukraine],” Robitnycha Hazeta, May 16, 1918, 2.
72 “Kudoiu ity [Where to Go]?,” Nova Rada, August 17, 1918, 1.
contrary, the Russian-language press of Kyiv welcomed the Hetman’s coup d’état as the precursor of Russia’s revival. \textit{Golos Kieva} was delighted with the German deposition of the Ukrainian Government.\textsuperscript{74} It anticipated the closure of the “nonviable” Ukrainian project and the subsequent “monarchical German” return to “traditional friendship with Petrograd.”\textsuperscript{75} The initial success of the German 1918 spring offensive on the Western front also prompted the emergence of the Russian \textit{Realpolitik} based on “German orientation.”\textsuperscript{76} Lastly, the media valued the German army’s protection against the Bolshevik threat.\textsuperscript{77}

Each of the national groups considered the victorious German state as an example to follow. \textit{Nova Rada} advocated for the European civilizational choice as an alternative to forced Russification,

\begin{quote}
instead of untidy impotent Moscow we want our external culture to match with the German, Romanic, and Anglo-Saxon cultures, we have had enough of the littered hut filled with fleas, we are longing for the space, air, light, and the conveniences of the white race...\end{quote}\textsuperscript{78}

Its motto was: “Enough with Moscow originality, long live the European stencil! But European! It is better to endure the European torturer rather than to live under Moscow granted freedom...”\textsuperscript{79} In particular, Germany appeared to be the most comprehensible example of a “civilized country,” whose values of social justice and the high standard of life the Ukrainians were striving to adopt.\textsuperscript{80} In order to achieve this goal \textit{Nova Rada} urged the public to cultivate the German-like spirit of “disciplined and systematic patriotism.”\textsuperscript{81} Likewise, the Russian \textit{Kievskaia Mysl} referred to the triumphant Germans as “teachers.” By learning from the best, Yulii Aikhenvald


\textsuperscript{75} “Iz Moskvy v Kiev (prodolzhenie) [From Moscow to Kyiv: A Sequel],” \textit{Golos Kieva}, May 3, 1918, 2.

\textsuperscript{76} “Germanskaia orientatsiia [The German Orientation],” \textit{Kievskaia Mysl}, May 9, 1918, 1; B.T., “Novyi proryv frantsuzskogo fronta [The New Breakthrough of the French Front],” \textit{Golos Kieva}, May 30, 1918, 1; B.T., “Novaia bitva na Marne [The New Battle of the Marne],” \textit{Golos Kieva}, June 1, 1918, 1.


\textsuperscript{78} Prychepa, “Demarkatsiina liniiia [The Demarcational Line],” \textit{Nova Rada}, January 16, 1918, 1.

\textsuperscript{79} “Hodi balakaty [Enough with Talking!],” \textit{Nova Rada}, May 15, 1918, 1.

\textsuperscript{80} S. Dr., “Postachannia moloka po mistakh Nimechchyny [The Milk Supply in the Cities of Germany],” \textit{Robitnycha Hazeta}, April 10, 1918, 2; “Shcho musyt znaty kozhen robitynik pro sviato 1 maia [What Should Each Worker Know About the 1st May Holiday?],” \textit{Robitnycha Hazeta}, April 27, 1918, 2; “Z istorii sotsializmu [From the History of Socialism],” \textit{Robitnycha Hazeta}, April 27, 1918, 2.

envisioned the possibility to outbid them in the near future — “the same way the Prussians had once overcome Napoleonic France.”

While the fact of the German occupation was officially negated, the daily news presented the opposite. The media discussed the “German order” — the consecutive measures of the German military administration, adopted to substitute the Hetman’s authority and enforce the region’s stability. For example, the German commandant’s office in Kyiv introduced rules on automobile traffic, certified gun owners, and prohibited any unauthorized public meetings. The Germans also managed to normalize the bread market of Kyiv through control over bakeries. On the regional level they endeavored to restore the production capacity of enterprises — either by salary motivation or by the threat of force. The press covered the German court-martial demonstration trials concerning the issues of larceny, felony, and sabotage.

By October of 1918 the Ukrainian media were still confident of Germany’s invincibility. They perceived Berlin’s peace offer as a goodwill gesture, designed to stop the bloodshed of the protracted conflict. As a result, the press managed to correctly assess the state of affairs only shortly before the Armistice. Its views of the November Revolution were ambivalent: while greeting the triumph of German Democracy, Nova Rada also empathized Germany’s “tragic end of the war.” In particular, the Ukrainian right-wing politician Dmytro Dontsov condemned the Entente for the mistreatment of the defeated party. He predicted Germany’s resurrection:

84 “Obiavlenie [The Announcement],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 9, 1918, 1; “Obiavlenie germanskoi komendatury (g. Kiev) [The Announcement of the German Commandant’s Office, Kyiv],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 11, 1918, 1; “1-e Maia [The 1st of May],” Poslednie Novosti, April 29, 1918, 1.
85 “Prodovolstvennyi vopros [The Question of Provision],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 28, 1918, 1.
86 “Na sudostroitelnykh zavodakh [At the Shipyards],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 11, 1918, 3; “Polozhenie v Nikolaev [The Situation in Mykolaiv],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 12, 1918, 3; “V Kerchi [In Kerch],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 31, 1918, 3; “Ochishchenie Kryma [The Clean-up of the Crimea],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 17, 1918, 1.
87 “Obiavleniia germanskogo komendanta [The Announcements of the German Commandant],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 15, 1918, 1; “Kazni [The Executions],” Kievskaia Mysl, June 7, 1918, 2; “Iz germanskikh ofitsialnykh istochnikov [From German Official Sources],” Kievskaia Mysl, May 5, 1918, 1.
88 “Stanovyshche Nimechchyny [The Condition of Germany],” Nova Rada, October 11, 1918, 1; “Propozytii myru [The Peace Proposal],” Nova Rada, October 8, 1918, 1.
89 S. Yefremov, “Vo imia liudskosti [In the Name of Humanity],” Nova Rada, October 9, 1918, 1; P. Didushok, “V spravi myru [In the Matter of Peace],” Nova Rada, October 19, 1918, 2.
90 D. Dontsov, “Pered katastrofoiu [On the Brink of Calamity],” Nova Rada, October 19, 1918, 1; P. Didushok, “Mozhlyvist konfliktu [The Possibility of Conflict],” Nova Rada, October 31, 1918, 2.
91 Ch.K., “Po Yevropi (Dorozhni vrazhinnia) [In Europe: Travel Impressions],” Nova Rada, December 27, 1918, 1–2; “Novi liude na obrii nimetskoho politychnoho zhytтя,” [The New People on the Horizon of the German Political Medium], Nova Rada, November 12, 1918, 1.
The Kaiser is only a temporary, though typical emanation of the German spirit. Deprived of one’s head, Prussian “militarism,” which has displayed such great moral strength and organizational ability in this war, — would not perish and certainly Germany would not revert to the times of Goethe and Schiller, to the times of its political lethargy...  

Concerning Ukrainian affairs, *Nova Rada* retrospectively blamed the German Junkers and the generals for their cooperation with the Russian “enemies of Ukrainian statehood.” Nevertheless, the newspaper hoped for the preservation of a strong democratic German state as a strategic ally of Ukraine.

The Russian-language press of Kyiv celebrated the forthcoming victory of the Allied Powers, interpreting it as the end of the German “Brest yoke” period of Russian history. *Golos Kieva* rejoiced over the failure of Germany’s “World Hegemony” and expected the near death of the “favorite child of the German imperialism — Ukrainian independence.” Professor Aleksandr Pogodin wrote:

> Our fathers had outlived the foundation of the German Empire, we observe its downfall. ... The New Grunwald [allusion to the battle of Grunwald] is destroying all those ephemeral state entities, which were created on the basis of the presently annulled Brest treaty. Admittedly, the Germans themselves were at a loss at what to do with these “states,” so that emerging Lithuania, the Baltic and Finnish states, not to mention Ukraine, disturbed them significantly. Their restitution to the bosom of a single Russia is indispensable...

---


94 Romul, “Na rozputti [At the Crossroads],” *Nova Rada*, December 1, 1918, 2; Ch.K., “Po Yevropi,” 1–2.

95 “Kiev, 7 oktiabria 1918 g. [Kyiv, October 7, 1918],” *Golos Kieva*, October 8, 1918, 1; “Kiev, 23 noiabria [Kyiv, November 23],” *Kievskaia Mysl*, November 23, 1918, 1.

96 Skif, “Kompromiss [The Compromise],” *Golos Kieva*, October 8, 1918, 1; Al. Pilenko, “Tochki zreniia [Points of View],” *Golos Kieva*, November 16, 1918, 2; Evgenii Efimovskii, “Kiev, 14 noiabria 1918 g. [Kyiv, November 14, 1918],” *Golos Kieva*, November 15, 1918, 1; “Ukrainskoe dzivzhenie [The Ukrainian Movement],” *Golos Kieva*, October 13, 1918, 4.

Similarly to *Golos Kieva*, the Russian liberal *Kievskaia Mysl* demonstrated an overt anti-Ukrainian stance. It reflected upon Germany’s idle attempt to partition the Russian state with the “artificial concept of Ukraine.”98 After the collapse of the Ukrainian Hetmanate in December of 1918, *Kievskaia Mysl* tagged it as a “German-Viennese operetta” with former Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskiy being “a shiny toy” for the German generals.99 At the same time, comforted by a sense of Russia’s involvement in the common Allied triumph, *Golos Kieva* sought for reconciliation with the Germans. Aleksandr Otsup believed that “the people from the Spree, the Elbe, and the Rhine, organized, methodical, slow-witted,” should take their rightful place in the family of Europe.100 Likewise, *Kievskaia Mysl* sympathized with the German Revolution and disapproved of the Entente’s harsh measures towards the defeated.101 It foresaw the future revival of a humiliated Germany “in an atmosphere, poisoned by hatred, lust for revenge, and national chauvinism.”102

Reaching its peak at the end of 1918, the Kyiv press’s interest in Germany had gradually declined in the following months of national turmoil. In 1919 the Germans no longer played a crucial role in the political destiny of Ukraine. Demoralized by their own revolution and the war defeat, German troops abandoned the country by March of 1919. Taking advantage of their withdrawal, the Russian Bolsheviks had launched a second military intervention in Ukraine already in November of 1918. Since then the Soviet–Ukrainian war became a primary object of media attention.

**Conclusion**

Within a year of the 1917 foundation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic the image of the Germans in the press of Kyiv had undergone a number of drastic changes. Different for the local Ukrainian and Russian-language media, these changes mirrored the two national paradigms. Specifically, it was the idea of national self-determination that had conditioned the Ukrainian newspapers’ attitude towards the Germans. Reluctant to support Russia’s war ambitions, the media had replaced propaganda of the “German foe” with the rhetoric of peace. The subsequent Ukrainian turnabout regarding the image of the “German ally” was triggered by the December 1917 Soviet Russian aggression against the UNR. Since then, the Bolshevik and, more generally, the Russian peril had predetermined the image of Germany as the lesser of two evils. Geopolitically, *Nova Rada* relied on Berlin’s support for Ukraine as a part of the “Russian colossus” restraining strategy. Neither the “outrageous” German interference into the country’s domestic affairs nor the 1918 *Deutsches Kaiserreich* defeat had effectively altered this conviction. As for the Russian-language press of Kyiv, its anti-German sentiment stemmed from all-Russian patriotism. In

---

98 “Hetmanshchina [The Hetmanate],” *Kievskaia Mysl*, December 15, 1918, 1; “Po Germanii. Doktor Paul Rorbach [In Germany, Dr. Paul Rohrbach],” *Kievskaia Mysl*, October 25, 1918, 1.
99 “Hetmanshchina,” 1.
100 A. A. Otsup, “Nedavnee [Recent Developments],” *Golos Kieva*, November 21, 1918, 3.
101 “V ozzvanie soveta deputatov [The Appeal of the Board of Deputies],” *Kievskaia Mysl*, November 17, 1918, 1; “Imperatorskaia semia [The Emperor’s Family],” *Kievskaia Mysl*, November 20, 1918, 3; “V Germanii [In Germany],” *Kievskaia Mysl*, November 23, 1918, 2.
the fall of 1917, the media continued to perceive Germany as the principal enemy, allegedly responsible for Russia's disintegration. In particular, they apprehended both the Bolshevik and the Ukrainian regimes as the products of the cunning Berlin policy of *divide et impera*. While silent or hypocritically respectful during the period of the “German military occupation,” the Russian newspapers had returned to their usual anti-German utterances on the eve of the Central Powers’ collapse in October of 1918.

Despite the controversy over Germany’s political role, both the Ukrainian and the Russian-language press of Kyiv shared a common view on the merits of *Kultur Deutschlands*. Throughout 1918 the media had praised the stereotypical German virtues of strong patriotism, order and discipline, integrity and diligence. They urged their audience to follow the German example of success and prosperity. Unanimously, the newspapers associated Germany with being a part of a better, “civilized” Europe to the west of the former Romanov Empire. Further studies should examine to what extent this positive image resembles the basic pre-war stereotypes about the Germans in the 1914 Kyiv press.

In general, the article has established a Ukrainian perspective on the image of the Germans in the First World War. The dispute between the Ukrainian and the Russian-language press of Kyiv over the issue of Germany should be seen as a reflection of the developments of the 1917–1918 Ukrainian Revolution.

**Bibliography**


Ivan Basenko is a PhD candidate at the Department of History of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine. He received his Master’s Degree in History from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 2011. His principal research interests lie in the fields of imagology, nationalism studies, and mass-media communications. The title of his PhD thesis is “The Image of the Germans in the Kyivan Press, 1914–1918.”